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ABSTRACT
Pleasure and Intrinsic Goodness
September 1980
Earl Conee, B.A., Trinity College
PH.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Fred Feldman
The three major philosophical connections between concepts are
analysis, epistemic mark, and general theoretical link. Each has been
thought to relate pleasure to intrinsic goodness. The Introduction con-
sists in a brief study of the nature of these connections. The body of
the thesis examines whether pleasure and intrinsic goodness are so re-
lated.
In Chapter III the question is whether the concept of pleasure en-
ters into an analysis of the concept of being intrinsically good. This
topic is approached through writings by Franz Brentano. It is argued
that no such analysis is possible.
Chapter III is concerned with whether pleasure can help us to
identify the bearers of intrinsic goodness. Again, some of Brentano 1 s
work is central to the topic, as is work by Charles Baylis. It is ar-
gued that pleasure is of no special help in discovering the intrinsic
goods.
Chapter IV begins with an attempt to give a clear and complete
formulation of hedoni sm--the theory according to which only pleasure is
intrinsically good. The formulation builds upon the efforts of Warren
TV
Quinn and Edward Oldfield. Then an argument against hedonism by
Brentano is critically assessed. C. D. Broad's objection to the effect
that the pleasure of malice is not intrinsically good is then evaluated,
as is G. E. Moore's objection to the effect that beauty is also intrin-
sically good. It is contended that hedonism does not succumb to any of
these objections.
The Appendix considers whether instrumental value of any sort de-
pends upon intrinsic goodness. It is argued that most familiar sorts do
not so depend, but one can be shown to do so by a kind of First Cause
argument
.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Broadly speaking, this dissertation is a search for philosoph-
ically significant ties between pleasure and intrinsic goodness. We
consider whether pleasure enters into an analysis of intrinsic goodness,
whether pleasure can be used in a criterion of intrinsic goodness, and
whether pleasure and intrinsic goodness are co-extensive. The purpose
of this introduction is to explain these topics. First, though, we
announce some presuppositions.
A. Some Presuppositions
Much that has been controverted is taken for granted here. I
might as well set out the main assumptions right here at the outset. I
assume that there is such a thing as intrinsic goodness (called by some
philosophers "inherent goodness," and by others "intrinsic desirabil-
ity"). I assume that there are intrinsic goods. I do not assume any
particular value theory, but I do take this much for granted: Evalua-
tive hedoni sm--very roughly the view that only pleasure is intrinsically
good and only pain is intrinsically bad--is not analytically or criter-
ially false. That is, I assume that it cannot be deduced just from an
analysis or an epistemic criterion of intrinsic goodness and uncontro-
versial premises that evaluative hedonism is false. This gives us some-
thing we must have to get anywhere: a test for proposed analyses and
criteria. And it does so without presupposing the truth, or even the
1
2possible truth, of any theory of value. Given how basic are the dis-
agreements about the existence, nature and application of intrinsic
goodness, it is good to be able to travel this lightly. It is hard to
see how we might make any important progress in this investigation using
only lighter normative baggage.
I assume that it does not affect the normative questions at issue
to take state of affairs or events to be the bearers of intrinsic good-
ness. I further assume that it does not hurt to take pleasure to be a
rel ation--the taking of pi easure--that can hold between a person and a
state of affairs. I attempt to answer relevant objections to this as
they arise. In each case, I am not maintaining the truth of the onto-
logical claim. I merely take it that we do proposals about pleasure and
intrinsic goodness no special harm by making the topic definite in this
way. (The reader is encouraged to verify as we go along that the ontol-
ogy makes no difference where it is not defended.)
Finally, it is assumed here that pleasure and pain come in de-
grees, and numerical comparisons within and between the two are pos-
sible J Outside of philosophy this is often assumed, as when someone
says, "I was pleased when Smith left, but I was twice as pleased when
Jones left," or "The pleasure of dining with them balanced off the pain
of waiting for them," or "Disease has caused a greater quantity of human
misery than famine." I know of no plausible grounds for doubting that
such quantitative relationships exist. 2 All doubts that make sense
here seem to reduce to doubts about the feasibility of finding out the
relevant amounts. I do not assume that that can be done.
3Of course the above list does not include everything of philosoph-
ical substance that is assumed below. But it summarizes the really big
presuppos i t ions
--the ones that some philosophers would find shocking or
appalling. They are fairly forewarned.
B. The Goals of Philosophical Analysis
We now proceed to examine in some detail the sorts of connections
between pleasure and intrinsic goodness that are to be studied here.
First, there is the question whether the concept of pleasure enters into
an analysis of intrinsic goodness. What would that entry amount to?
Without trouble, we can work any concept into a necessary equivalence
with intrinsic goodness:
Pl.l p is intrinsically good iff p is intrinsically good and either
p is intrinsically good or
,
where the blank can be filled in with an expression for any concept, and
a truth results. At the other extreme, it is reasonably clear that the
concept of pleasure is not part of what is meant by "intrinsically good"
in English. The following example can make that plausible: A child is
raised in an anti-hedonistic sub-culture. The child is kept in complete
ignorance on the topic of pleasure, never having any himself and never
getting any evidence about what it is like. The child is taught the
concept of intrinsic goodness, though. The examples used are cases of
things taken by the anti-hedonists to be good on their own: hard work
and perseverance in the face of misfortune. It is insisted that these
be sought for their own sake.^
4Thus we should not expect to find a phrase synonymous with "in-
trinsically good" in which the concept of pleasure is expressed. And we
can find every number of uninteresting necessary equivalences involving
pleasure and intrinsic goodness. But there is something in between of
considerable importance to philosophers: analysis or philosophical def-
inition. What does it take to have one of those? This is not the place
for a full study of analysis. But it will be worth our while to consi-
der a recent proposal by Roderick Chisholm. 4 j0 understand the pro-
posed analysis of analysis, first we need:
Dl.l £ jmpl ies G = df . p is necessarily such that, if it obtains,
then something has G.
D1.2 £ involves q = df
.
pis necessarily such that whoever enter-
tains it entertains q.
D1.3 p involves G = df
. p involves a q which is necessarily such
that it obtains iff something has G, and G is not an all or
nothing property (i.e., possibly, something has G and some-
thi ng does not)
.
In terms of these defined expressions we are given:
D1.4 p analyzes q = df. (i) p is logically equivalent to q; and
(ii) both p and q imply a property that p involves but q does
not involve; and (iii) p involves every state of affairs that
q involves.
The example:
el (a) Something is a male and a sibling, analyzes (b) Something
is a brother,
5can be used to see how D1.4 works. Clearly (a) is necessarily equiv-
alent to (b). Is there a property that both require to be instantiated,
while only (a) requires entertaining something logically equivalent to
its instantiation? Yes, the property of being a sibling. There must be
a sibling when (b) is true. But we must think of something being a sib-
ling (or an equivalent) when thinking of (a), and not (b). That, at any
rate, is how the example is supposed to work.
However well we judge D1.4 to work in cases like el, other cases
make it look much too restrictive. We do not want to set our goal of an
analytic connection between the concepts of pleasure and intrinsic good-
ness so high that it is not met by:
e2 (c) Something is a closed, 3-dimensional figure with every
side being a square plane segment, analyses (d) Something is a
cube.
E2 is, I think, as lucid, succinct, and illuminating an explanation of a
geometrical concept as we can find. Yet (c) does not involve everything
(d) involves, for it does not involve (d). Many have to figure out the
fact that (c) pertains to cubes. So that is not staring them in the
mind's eye when first they entertain (c). Furthermore, it is manifest
that almost none of the concept analyses, e.g. of knowledge, which are
actually proposed of late include analysans that involve their analy-
sanda. This lack of involvement is not in fact counted as refutation of
these proposals. Of course this might be a mistake. But the widespread
sustained interest in these proposals suggests that something weaker
than a D1 .4-anal ysi s would be significant. Surely e2 for instance
states a connection that is more interesting than non-obvious
equivalence. Compare e2 with:
6
necessary
e3 There is no negation-complete formal theory of arithmetic,
analyses (g) Something is yellow or nothing is yellow.
To explain what some seek from analyses, construction metaphors
are often employed. The analysans, it is said, should tell us what are
the "building blocks" of the analysandum, and it should say how the
blocks are "put together." But not everything that appears to be a suc-
cessful analysis conforms to that metaphor. Consider:
e4 (h) Something is a brother or a sister, analyzes (i) Something
is a sibling.
The construction metaphor would have it that el tells us that being a
sibling is a building block of being a brother. But e4 seems as satis-
factory an analysis as el, and the metaphor would have it that e4 tells
us that being a brother is a building block of beihg a sibling (albeit
one that is "disjunctively joined" to another to make up siblinghood,
while siblinghood is "conjunctively joined" in the composition of broth-
erhood). No building can be made out of blocks related as el and e4
would tell us brotherhood and siblinghood are. If one part is made out
of two others, neither of the two can be made out of it. Perhaps we
will come to be so well justified in accepting some theory of property
composition that we become entitled to reject the "construction" indi-
cated by el or e4. But that would not solve the problem. There is
clearly something which would be of philosophical interest (if these
were philosophically interesting concepts) that el and e4 do equally
wel 1
.
7
There is another sort of problem for D1.4. Herbert Heidelberger
has pointed out 5 that it counts the following as a case of analysis:
e5 (j) Something is a brother and a sibling, analyzes (k) Some-
thing is a brother.
But e5 and any other example where the expression of the analysans con-
tains the expression of the analysandum is not a good analysis. At
least such circularity is a fatal weakness for some purposes to be
served by analysis. e5 and its ilk cannnot be used to informatively
identify which concept a phrase expresses, or to solve any puzzle about
its nature. 5 Yet some aims of analysis are achieved only when the
analysans at least involves the analysandum. To show by analysis that
"the average tomato" only appears to refer, the analyzing sentences must
convey the whole meanings of the ones containing putative reference to
an average tomato. Otherwise we have not been shown that we can, with-
out such reference, say everything that can be said with it. Further-
more, D1.4 has a feature that it is important for a notion of analysis
to have--it blocks the paradox of analysis. 7 Briefly stated the para-
dox is this: Some have held that analysans and analysandum are identi-
cal . It is therefore found paradoxical that analyses are more informa-
tive than what is expressed by an identity statement where the same re-
ferring expression appears twice. On D1.4's account the analysans is a
different proposition than the analysandum--one which differs by
8asserting something which is just implied by the latter. That allows
Dl. 4-analyses to be sufficiently informative.
I think it is a mistake to look for some one kind of equiva-
lence— "analysis"—that accomplishes all these things. As I see it,
there are many kinds of valuable necessary equivalences. Different
kinds fulfill different philosophical purposes. We can identify these
goals and say what it takes to achieve them. The expression "analysis"
has been used by philosophers to cover a variety of philosophical objec-
tives. G. E. Moore, the philosopher who did the most to give it cur-
rency, used the term in several ways. There is nothing at all obvious
that his uses of the term share. 8 I see nothing of philosophical im-
portance that can only be settled when we determine which equivalences
it is best to call "analyses."
The sort of ontological reduction already mentioned requires syn-
onymy. To rid ourselves of the need to suppose that a term with clear
and definite meaning refers, we must see that its linguistic work can be
done without any phrase that gives evidence of denoting what the former
would denote if it did. So in the case of this philosophical goal, what
is expressed by the reducing and the reduced sentences must enter into
the strongest of equivalence relat ions--identi ty. Such reduction is
best expressed by sentences of the form: "A is a potentially ontologi-
cally misleading way to say B." This will be philosophically helpful
when it enables us to see that the truth of A only requires us to
acknowledge the ontology of B, rather than the additional thing(s) that
A suggests.
9Another implication of identity occurs when mere synonymy is ex-
pressed, e.g. with expressions of the form: "A means the same as B
I
can see no philosophical aim that is always achieved by truths of that
form, even when A and B are different expressions for philosophically
significant propositions. Many such sentences are useful in conveying
concepts. That is no philosophical enterprise (though it is part of
some). There are two sorts of philosophical work that can be accom-
plished by sentences of that form. But neither requires identity.
One such task is the elucidation of philosophical concepts. It is
quite difficult to say in general what that is. This is partly because
different theories of properties and propositions impose quite different
constraints. Suuppose a theory that appeals to the construction meta-
phor is right. Then, assuming that, e.g. brotherhood is a complex
"structure," it can be fully elucidated by saying what its simple
"parts" are and how they are "put together." Perhaps el makes these
elements and their relationship obvious. And perhaps (a) in el means
the same as (b). Then "'Something is a brother, 1 means the same as
'Something is a male and a sibling'" would be a tolerably clear way to
impart the details of what goes into the concept of being a brother.
But even better would be an expression that is explicit about the con-
struction, such as:
e6 (1) Something falling under the conjunction of the concepts
maleness and siblinghood is identical with (m) something being
a brother.
10
If e6 is true, it is informative. It is also clear that (1) and (m) are
not synonymous, so this informativeness should not seem paradoxical.
One way the sentence el could be informative while (a) means the same as
(b) is by making evident by its syntax the "construction" of brother-
hood, i.e., what e6 tells us explicitly. But if all that is assumed for
the moment, then how is e4 informative? It cannot be by displaying the
composition of brotherhood.
Whether some concepts are built out of others or not, plainly it
illuminates a concept to be told inexplicit implications of it. That
is, if we provide an equivalent that involves a mere implication of the
concept's application, we show something of what goes along with that
application. This is a service that every D1 .4-analysi s does provide.
And regardless of whether "constructivists" are correct, we are free to
say that that is something that e4 accomplishes (and el too, if Chisholm
is right that (b) does not involve (a)). It is worth noting that circu-
larity does not ruin a proposal for this purpose. 9 Note also that
this task does not require that one equivalent have all the involvements
of the other. That condition of D1.4 (perhaps intended to provide for
reduction by "analysis") should not be imposed on all explanations of
concepts. I have no full account of concept explanation. One good
question is whether any invol vemental overlap is needed. I neither see
how to argue that it is, nor see a clear case that lacks it. In any
event, this work of bringing out implications is fundamental to one sort
of concept explanation.
11
The other philosophical task that an assertion of a meaning iden-
tity may accomplish is what is sometimes called “clarification," some-
times explication" of concepts. That aim usually arises like this: An
expression is said to express a concept having certain remarkable prop-
erties or covering just a certain range of cases. Some philosophers
doubt whether any concept has those features, or wonder which qualities
are present in just those cases. By expressing in clear terms a concept
which undoubtedly has those features or applies in just the right cases,
the "clarification" or "explication" is accomplished. This might be
done by offering a synonymous expression that uses sufficiently clear
terminology to make the relevant qualities or extension manifest. But
providing another concept (usually, an equivalent is required) that has
those features would do as well. I take that to be what is actually be-
ing attempted in the name of "analyzing knowledge," for example. Also,
even a complicated equivalent often can supply a better understanding of
the initial concept. For the target concept is often the psychological-
ly easiest or most prominent way to conceive of the extension in ques-
tion. E2 gives an excellent example of how this sort of thing works
(though there is nothing philosophically doubtful or fascinating about
cubicality in the first place.) (c) employs basic geometrical concepts
in straightforward relationships that result in a condition for which
the intuitively simplest concept is that of being a cube. Here it is
worth pointing out that circularity does spoil a proposal for this en-
deavor. E4, for instance, cannot perform this task. Questions about
whether there is a concept having certain properties or curiosity about
12
what distinguishes a certain extension is not legitimately met by use of
the very expression or presupposition of the very conceptual means in
question to the extension.
So much by way of brief indication of what might be sought from
analysis. Why should we consider whether pleasure and intrinsic good-
ness are related in some such way? Well, apart from the intrinsic in-
terest of the question, we can point to these things: Brentano seems to
have thought that there is such an equivalence, perhaps an identity, in-
volving the two concepts JO On the basis of it he proposed an epi s-
temic criterion of intrinsic goodness 11 and an argument for the propo-
sition that if pleasure is intrinsically good, then so is something
else . 12 Further, some philosophers have had doubts about the nature
or application of intrinsic goodness . 12 So what we have called "clar-
ification" by appeal to the concept of pleasure would be worthwhile.
C. The Form of Epistemic Principles
Our next objective is an epistemic criterion of intrinsic goodness
by use of pleasure. What does it take to have one of those? It is un-
illuminating and misleading to say that it takes "a way of finding out
what is intrinsically good." That is too broad and too narrow. A "way"
that consists in consulting someone who knows does not count, and a pro-
posal that merely improves our evidence about what is intrinsically good
does. The general situation is this: There is an ordering of cate-
gories of propositions according to the quality of the evidence we can
have for propositions in the category. Philosophers dispute what stands
13
where, but it is widely acknowledged that the contents of sense experi-
ence, physical object statements, and cosmological hypotheses are at in-
creasingly distant locations in this ordering. This introduction is not
the place to defend, or even to propose, a ranking, but we can say this
much. Any true proposal maintaining that evidence from one level in the
ordering lends favorable epistemic status to a proposition further out
is a candidate for being a significant criterion. It j_s significant if
the subject matter is of interest. In fact, it suffices for the pro-
posal to have some interest if it so relates propositions that have been
reasonably thought to be at such different levels.
There are major differences in strength among these proposals.
For our purposes, the best we could find would be a criterion that iden-
tifies some maximally good evidence that depends somehow upon pleasure
for the proposition that a certain state is intrinsically good. That
might seem to amount to any true principle of the form:
Cl. 1 Necessarily, if S considers p and S has (such-and-such a prop-
osition involving pleasure) as evidence, then nothing is more
reasonable for S than that p is intrinsically good.
But Cl.l is just a strict conditional. Compare:
Cl. 2 Necessarily, if Jones has Smith's testimony that there is life
on Mars as evidence, then nothing is more reasonable for Jones
than the proposition that he exists.
The pleasure in a principle of the form of Cl.l may play no greater role
than the testimony in Cl. 2. We want the evidence to be what supports
the intrinsic goodness claim, not a mere sufficient condition for its
14
having support. Can we say what it is for one proposition to lend cre-
dence to another when the one is had as evidence? I believe that we
can. In "Propositional Justification,"U I offer a definition of the
weak propositional support relation of "tending to confirm." I make use
of the preliminary notion:
S has mini mal evidence for h = df (i) h is evident for S, and
(ii) there is a p such that p is evident for S, p entails each thing
evident for S, and this is not possible;: there is a q such that p
entails but is not entailed by q, q entails each thing evident for
S, and q entails h.
On the basis of that, I say:
e tends to confirm h = df necessarily, for any S, if S has minimal
evidence for e, then believing h is more reasonable for S than be-
lieving not h.
By use of the same devices, we can isolate stronger evidential re-
lationships:
D1.5 e justifies h = df. Necessarily, if S has minimal evidence
for e, the h is evident for S.
D1.6 e proves h = df. Necessarily, if S has minimal evidence for
e, then h is known by S.
D1.7 e makes h certain = df. Necessarily, if S has minimal evi-
dence for e, then nothing is more reasonable for S than h.
Unfortunately, propositional justification relations do not im-
mediately yield means to belief justification. Consider an e which does
15
in fact justify an h, and is of a more secure epistemic rank than h.
Those assumptions do not imply:
Cl. 3 Necessarily, if S has e as evidence, then h is evident for S.
Since S may have e and some countervailing evidence about h, the mere
possession of e does not insure that h is evident. It is one thing for
a proposition to favor another's truth to some degree, and quite another
for the one to make a person under certain specific conditions reason-
able or justified in believing the other. Obviously, the latter also
depends upon what other evidence the person then has.
I do not known how to give a precise explanation of the relation
of making evident. 15 Qnce we see this difference, though, it becomes
clear that the primary and purely philosophical question for us is
whether some proposition involving in a crucial way the concept of
pleasure lends some degree of evidential support to the proposition that
a state is intrinsically good. Finding an actually employable criterion
of the sort will be possible only if there is such a support relation
that underlies it and if we can actually get into the situation de-
scribed by the antecedent. (Note that, if a pleasure proposition can
make the intrinsic goodness of a state evident to S under certain condi-
tions, then S's total evidence in those conditions Dj-justi fi es that the
state is intrinsically good.) So this is a partly empirical matter, and
one that implies that a suitable propositional justification relation
holds. Thus it is not unreasonable to concentrate on the former kind of
question, at least until we discover a successful proposal.
16
Concerning the philosophical significance of a true proposal of
this sort, little need be said. The question whether, and on what ba-
sis, we might know or even reasonably believe a thing to have value is
among the best examples of a matter of philosophical interest. And
there is ample historical justification to search for evidence of in-
trinsic goodness that relies upon pleasure in particular. Brentano
certainly turned to it as a source of knowledge of intrinsic good-
ness, 16 and Meinong probably did. 17 We should take that as good
evidence that there is something of philosophical value to be learned by
conducting such a search.
D. Philosophical Theories
Finally, we will look into hedoni sm--the theory that singles out
pleasurable experiences as the bearers of intrinsic goodness. This is
called a "theory" of intrinsic goodness. What is required for such a
theory to succeed? There is a genuine problem here. Suppose we have a
Dl. 4-analysis of intrinsic goodness. Then we can say that the bearers
of intrinsic goodness are the states that satisfy its analysans. Why is
not that a "theory" of intrinsic goodness? It is an illuminating way to
identify what is intrinsically good. And we should not requi re that
such a "theory" give us a characteri zation of the intrinsic goods that
is epi stemical ly helpful. Theories of value qualities, such as Mill's
theory of moral rightness, rarely provide any epistemic help. That is
what we demand of a criterion (though of course we will take it where we
get it). What, then, is peculiar to a "theory"?
17
In one respect the standard seems to be more lenient than those
for what was discussed under the title "analysis" above. For it seems
plain that a theory's characterization of the bearers of a property need
not share any involvement with that property. As mentioned above, such
sharing seems requisite for any "analytic" task. But of course this
does not show why, e.g. a D1.4-analysi s fails to be a "theory." We must
not insist that there be no sharing of involvements. That would unrea-
sonably prejudge, e.g., the question whether the concept of pleasure
enters into both a D1.4-anal ysi s and a theory of intrinsic goodness, for
example.
The prominent historical philosopher to have attempted to say what
we seek from a "theory" of a value property is G. E. Moore. 18 Speak-
ing of a theory of rightness, he said that we are looking for "the rea-
son why an act is right," a property such that acts are right "because"
they have it. 19
Unfortunately, that account is unsati sfactory. Strictly, clear
cases of reasons are all considerations by someone for doing something.
Unless we accept cosmological views attributed to Descartes according to
which someone--God--might really have had a reason for making necessary
truths true, this sense of "reason" seems inapplicable here. For it is
uncontroversial that intrinsic goods are necessarily so. There is a
broader sense of reason that can be very vaguely indicated as: thing in
virtue of which such-and-such. But in that sense, the only candidate
for a "reason" why intrinsic goods are such would seem to be the prop-
erty of intrinsic goodness itself. "Because" has the first sense
18
attributed to reason." It also expresses causation. But there is no
cause for the bearing of an essential property. Appeal to causation
here appears to be entirely unhelpful.
Moore asserted a distinction between "natural" and "non-natural"
properties. Many philosophers, Ernest Sosa being the most recent, 20
have appealed to a distinction between "evaluative" and "non-eval uati ve"
properties. Equivalences where one side can be taken to be about one of
the former kinds of properties while the other side can be taken to be
about one of the latter seem to have special philosophical interest.
Most regrettably, though, no tolerably clear account of either distinc-
tion is avail able. 21 I have none to offer. Without that, we cannot
sensibly investigate the basis for such interest. (Also, this would at
best show us what is interesting about certain "theories" of value prop-
erties. There is no reason to expect that it would lead to a general
account of what is distinctive about philosophical "theories.")
I must leave it an open question why certain equivalences involv-
ing concepts of interest to philosophers are deemed "theories" of those
concepts.
Our philosophical interest in proposals such as hedonism for iden-
tifying the bearers of intrinsic goodness needs no excuse. Because of
their paucity of shared involvements with intrinsic goodness, they are
informative, if true. What we lack is not reason to be interested, but
a general way to mark them off from "analytic" connections on the one
hand and equivalences like e3 where neither side even seems to be about
the other, much less one being a "theory" of the other.
19
Theories of intrinsic goodness like hedonism and its rivals seem
not to be susceptible to clearcut proof or refutation. How should we
expect them to be supported, then? We can reasonably demand these two
things: First, a clear statement of the theory. As an example of what
needs doing, consider the formulation of hedonism: "All and only states
of pleasure are intrinsically good." What does that tell us about:
e6 Smith being pleased to know that Jones is pained.
E6 would appear to be a "state of pleasure." And yet intuitively the
hedonist should not count it as good. 22 The second support we can ask
of hedonism is a clear account of the replies available on behalf of
the theory to objections that have been thought to be tel ling. 23
E. The Contents of the Appendix
An appendix is appended. This gives the thesis an organic unity.
It is not central to our inquiry, since it does not concern any putative
connection between pleasure and intrinsic goodness. It is about intrin-
sic goodness and its relation to instrumental value. The question is
whether an event being of instrumental value of some sort implies the
occurrence of an intrinsic good. My approach is the maximally straight-
forward one: I attempt to identify clearly the concepts of instrumental
value that are in common use, and those that have been topics in discus-
sions of this question. This done, the concepts virtually speak for
themselves as to whether there is such an implication.
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Notes to Chapter I
More precisely, it is not questioned here that there is a maa-
^
ltU
^
e
IZ
1
?
tenSlty “ _th at Pleasures and pains have in common. It is as-
sumed that we can stipulate an arbitrary pleasure to have one unit ofintensity and they gain numbers (minus ones for pains, plus for plea-
sures) by comparison with that standard. (For example, let one inten-
sity unit equal the highest intensity of pleasure attained by theinventor of the vinyl auto roof in the minute following the realization
£L
thS significance of hls discovery.) That gives some quantities for ahedonistic theory of value to work with. We do not assume which, if
any, function from those numbers to intrinsic value ratings is the cor-
rect one. I believe that even the purely quantitative hedonist has
choices here. For instance, the intrinsic value might be the square of
the intensity of the pleasure, and (minus) the cube of the intensity of
the pain. This would give us a way to bear out a certain difficult
saying of Moore's:
[ P ] a i n . . . appears to be a far worse evil than pleasure is a good.
( Principia Ethica , p. 212)
We read in the prefix: "At any given intensity, ..."
2john Bennett in "The Problem of Interpersonal Utility Compari-
sons" (unpublished manuscript) points out that measurement theory im-
poses certain constraints on what pleasure and pain can be like if they
are to have this sort of quantifiable aspect. I see no grounds to doubt
that these constraints are obeyed in the case of the intensity of these
attitudes. If, as Bennett contends, we must prove that there is this
obedience, I do not know how to do so. I do not know any reason to
think this must be shown, however.
^We should not get carried away about what we can learn about a
concept by seeing what behavior might suffice to teach it, or an expres-
sion for it. The important features of this example are those making it
believable that the child gains awareness of intrinsic goodness with no
awareness of pleasure. It would not suffice to observe that "intrinsic-
ally good" can be taught without expressing or referring explicitly to
the concept of pleasure. Meanings can be taught by introducing the ex-
pressions in situations involving mere cues that make it psychologically
normal to bring the appropriate concept to mind. Nothing close to a
synonym or conceptual breakdown need be given. So, from our not finding
a concept expressed or denoted by anything other than the expression
being taught, we cannot validly infer that the concept is not part of
the expression's sense.
It is worth looking briefly at an argument that such considera-
tions suggest: It is plausible that the following two means of convey-
ing concepts are exhaustive--expl anation in terms of previously acquired
concepts, and ostensive explanation. So if the example of the child is
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possible, then it seems we can conclude that something other than dIp*sure is intrinsically good. For the child was not given an explicii defimtion of intrinsically good. 11 Thus he must have been shown some ex"amp es and he was not shown any cases of pleasure. The problem here is"that explanating in terms of other concepts does not reduce to providina
a synonymous expression as a definition. Dictionaries rarely provide
9
actual synonyms. The way we acquire concepts by looking up words inthem includes being guided by the given definiens (and perhaps some il-lustrative contexts of use) to latch onto a concept that it is not psy-chologically natural or normal then to think of, though that concept ^s
not expressed by the definiens. And we can learn a concept by osten-
tions that do not include even one positive instance of it if for ex-
amp e, our knowledge of the pointer enables us to think of what he
would (perhaps perversely) take the indicated items to share. Very lit-tle about what is analytic to a concept can be inferred from the meretact that certain utterances or gestures can suffice to convey it.
^Presented in a seminar at UMass/Amherst
,
in Sprinq 1978. Un-
published
,
I think.
^Presented in the aforementioned seminar.
6 See further on in this section for more on such puzzles, and
how they might be solved.
7The vast literature on this starts with C. H. Langford,
"Moore^s Notion of Analysis," from P. A. Schlipp (ed.), The Philosophy
of G. E. Moore (New York: Tudor Park (1952), pp. 319-343.
8 E. Klemke makes this point with documentation in the chapter
"Analysis" of The Epistemology of G. E. Moore (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1969), pp. 64-91.
9 If Chisholm is right that (b) does not involve (a), then coming
to see their equivalence can make a contribution to our understanding of
what is present where brotherhood is instantiated. It may strain the
metaphor to say that this "illuminates" the concept itself. More pre-
cisely, it illuminates those situations where the concept is instanti-
ated. When the nature of those situations is something we seek to un-
derstand about the concept, then it is fair to say that it helps with
our understanding of the concept. (Note that that is something a
meaning identity claim cannot do for us.)
lOFranz Brentano, The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and
Wrong
,
(New York: Humanities Press, 1969), p. 18.
1
1
Ibid
.
,
p. 22.
l^Franz Brentano, The Foundation and Construction of Ethics (New
York: Humanities Press, 1973), p. 164.
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Monroe Beardsley expresses doubts about the existence or att *1e actual application, of intrinsic goodness in "Intrinsic Value"Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 25 (1965), pp. K Htraces such reservations to writings by John Dewey.
^ Philosophical Studies
, forthcoming.
^Mark Pastin has made several efforts in this direction. See,
e.g., Warranting Reconsidered," Synthese 38 (1978), pp. 459-464. Forproblems with Pastin's approach, see Fred Feldman, "Final Comments onthe Analysis of Warranting," Synthese 38 (1978), pp. 465-469.
22 .
1 6 Brentano, The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong
, p.
17 A. Meinong, On Emotional Presentatio n (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 19/2), p. 121
.
E. Moore, Ethics (London:
pp. 19-20.
Oxford University Press, 1965),
19g. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (London: Cambridae Universitv
Press, 1903), pp. 39-41.
20ln Ernest Sosa, "The Foundations of Foundational i sm," (Nous,
forthcoming).
21 Good criticisms of what Moore says about the "natural/non-
natural" property distinction appear in Fred Feldman, Introductory
Ethics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1978), pp. 203-205. Sosa does
not attempt to explain the "eval uative/non-eval uative" property distinc-
tion. I know of no good account elsewhere.
22d4.9 of Chapter IV below excludes e6 as a basic bearer of
hedonic value.
^This is attempted in Chapter IV below in sections D-F.
CHAPTER II
PLEASURE AND THE ANALYSIS OF INTRINSIC GOODNESS
Many philosophers have sought analytic connections between posi-
tive emotive attitudes and intrinsic goodness. 1 Indeed, proposals
that appeal to pleasure in particular continue to be made. 2 As I es-
timate the sitaution, such connections can be fully investigated by
carefully examining what is said and suggested by certain writings by
Franz Brentano on the topic. The fundamental variations and problems
among accounts with some initial plausibility all arise quite naturally
in a study of Brentano's work. That is how the topic will be approached
here.
Methodologically speaking, if the remarks about "analysis" in the
Introduction are correct, then there are several sorts of "analytic" re-
lationships which might be discovered. Two factors stand out as appro-
priate tests for the presence of such connections. First, we have seen
that necessary equivalence is requisite for any such link. So a coun-
terexample precludes any such tie. And second, circularity is a major
liability. Circular equivalences can bring to light non-obvious impli-
cations of the concept at stake. But they cannot accomplish the dis-
tinctively "analytic" tasks: removing obscurity, reducing ontology,
"constructing" concepts. ^ Thus, only after these two tests have been
passed would it be worthwhile to sort out which "analytic" tasks an
equivalence performs.
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nitla1 Readings of Brentano's Analysis
Brentano's main purpose in The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right.
an d Wrong 4 is to say how we can gain adequate evidence for judgments
concerning the moral status of acts. In his view that evidence partly
consists in what we can know to be good and bad. He proposed criteria
by means of which we are to be able to acquire such knowledge. Some
comments in the essay are clearly intended as some sort of explanations
of concepts of goodness. These criteria and comments suggest interest-
ing and intuitively attractive equivalences between conditions involving
pleasure and intrinsic goodness. Those suggestions will be developed
and assessed here.
The first passage we should look at is this one:
We call a thing good when the love relating to it is correct. In
the broadest sense of the term, the good is that which is worthy of
love, that which can be loved with a love that is correct.
24 Among the things that please us, we may distinguish between those
that are pleasing in themselves and those which are pleasing in vir-
tue of something else. In the latter case, the thing is pleasing in
virtue of what it brings about or preserves or makes probable.
Hence we must distinguish between primary and secondary goods--
between what is good in itself and what is good in virtue of some-
thing else. The useful is a clear example of the latter type of
good.
^
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The part of this citation before section 24 plainly is not intended to
be an account of intrinsic goodness. Brentano surely means the distinc-
tion between “what is good in itself" and “what is good in virtue of
something else" to be the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic
goodness. And while the first part of the citation is said to be about
“good" read “in the broadest sense of the term," the citation is fol-
lowed with the remark that the good in itself is the “'good' in its nar-
row sense. 6 But it will be seen that on one interpretation Brentano
is drawing upon part of his account of the “broadest" sense of "good"
when he tells us about the good in itself in section 24. So it is
worthwhile to have the whole citation available as one piece.
How shall we understand the cited comments about the good in it-
self? There is no clinching indication what sort of explanation of the
concept of intrinsic goodness is being attempted. The use of "hence" in
the passage suggests that the distinction between what is intrinsically
good and what is extri nsical ly good is supposed to follow directly and
obviously from the fact that some things are "pleasing in themselves"
and others are "pleasing in virtue of something else." So the closer
the connection between being pleasing in itself and being intrinsically
good on the one hand, and being pleasing in virtue of something else and
being extri nsical ly good on the other, the better justified is the re-
mark. Also, an equivalence between the former pair would give us a dra-
matically simple link between pleasure and intrinsic goodness. So it
behooves us to consider it.
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What exactly are these two ways of being pleasing? Brentano of-
fers no explanation. The simplest view seems to be this: We assume
without explanation the two place relation of something being an object
of pleasure for a person. We also assume the three place relation of
something being an object of pleasure for a person because of something
that the person takes to be brought about, preserved, or made probable
by the first. Then we stipulate:
02,1 £J_§ pleasing for $ in virtue of q = df. p is an object of
pleasure for S because S takes it that p brings about, pre-
serves, or makes probable q.
*2 p is pl easing in itself for S = df. p is an object of pleas-
ure for S, and there is no q such that p is pleasing for S in
virtue of q.7
Applying this distinction to the text in the most straightforward way,
we get:
D2.3 p is intrinsically good = df. There is someone, S, such that
p is pleasing in itself for S.
As pleasing as D2.3 is in virtue of the relatively simple tie it
asserts between pleasure and intrinsic goodness, it is unacceptable.
Moreover, it should not finally be attributed to Brentano, since he
gives what is in effect an excellent counterexample to D2.3 almost imme-
diately after our first citation:
[I]t often happens as a result of habit that what is first desired
merely as a means to something else comes to be desired for itself
alone. Thus the miser is reduced to heaping up riches irrationally
8
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Thus Brentano describes a case where something intrinsically neutral--
the miser acquiring riches-becomes desired (and, we can assume, pleas-
ing) in itself for him.
Another problem for D2.3 is that it is plainly asking too much of
the intrinsically good things to require that each actually be the ob-
ject of someone's pleasure.
Were difficulties of these two sorts the only faults in D2.3, it
could be repaired with ease. In cases like that of the miser, the
states that become pleasing in themselves do not start out that way. It
may be credible that they would only come to be pleasing in thesmelves
as a result of habituation. We might then interpret Brentano to have
been proposing that the intrinsic goods are states which are spontane-
ously pleasing in themselves. To meet the second difficulty, we can
read the proposal as explicitly giving only a sufficient condition. The
most natural modification to gain a necessary and sufficient condition
has intrinsic goods being possible objects of the right sort of pleas-
ure. Those two changes yield:
D2.4 p is intrinsically good = df. Possibly, there is someone, S,
and a time, t, such that p is pleasing in itself for s at t,
and at no time up to t was there a q such that p was pleasing
to S in virtue of q.
Brentano provides in the essay the basic materials for a counter-
example to D2.4, too. Soon after our first citation, he suggests that
we "... imagine now another species quite different from ourselves;
. . . they . . . despise insight and love error for its own sake." 9
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We have a counterexample to 02.4 when we supplement the case with the
modest further assumptions that the species takes the attitude spon-
taneously, that error is not intrinsically good, and that such a species
is possible. Even if normal humans do not take such attitudes, we can-
not plausibly preclude their possibility.
It is worth adding that there are many who are spontaneously
pleased by various i ntri nsical ly neutral states. Some delight in the
thought that the universe had a beginning; others take joy in the
thought that it is not the case that the universe had a beginning. Some
members of each group do not find their thought about the origin of the
universe delightful because of anything else, and never did. Yet we can
take it as axiomatic that not both a state and its negation are in-
trinsically good. In this case it is plausible that each is neutral.
The sort of objection raised for D2.4 indicates a basic problem
for its approach. D2.4 claims that the intrinsic goodness of something
is implied by the possibility of someone addressing a simple kind of
psychological attitude toward it. But reflection reveals no credibility
to the supposition that the possible extension of any such attitude is
restricted in a normatively interesting way. Indeed, they seem virtual-
ly unrestricted (perhaps one of the few exceptions is that the most bla-
tant of contradictions cannot be believed). Thus no attitude by itself
will isolate the intrinsic goods. When evaluating such a proposal, we
have only to remind ourselves how irrational people can be, how willful,
and how base. We then see that such attempts are not promising.^ 0
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And we also see that restrictions upon what other attitudes have been,
or are being, held do not significantly improve the account.
—Revised Interpretations of Brentano's Analysis
Obviously the possibility remains that non-attitudinal restric-
tions on pleasures will work. We can approach that question by investi-
gating a way in which we may have misconstrued the initially cited re-
marks. Looking back at the passage, we see that Brentano distinguishes
the two ways of being pleasing right after having spoken of “love" that
is "correct." Now it is clear from several comments in the essay that
love is being used there in a particularly broad manner. In one
place, he writes of giving preference to one thing over another as
"loving" the one "more" than the other. 11 He also writes that "...
a natural feeling of pleasure is a higher love . . ."12 Thus it seems
proper to interpret some of his uses of "love" to be his way to express
a variety of attitudes involving the taking of pleasure. So it may be
that Brentano meant still to be discussing "love" that is "correct" in
section 24. The two ways of being pleasing (i.e., "loved") would then
be asserted there to identify the two sorts of goods when the pleasure
is "correct ." That allows us to read Brentano to equate being
intri nsical ly good with being possibly correctly pleasing in itself for
someone.
But of course to understand that we need to know what Brentano
meant by "correct" in the passage. It is vital that we learn what we
can from Brentano about this concept of correctness, anyway. He makes
30
use of it in his criterion for determining that a thing is intrinsically
good, a topic of Chapter III. Unfortunately, we are told much less than
it would be helpful to know about the notion. It is not hard to say
very roughly what Brentano had in mind. Correctness is to be a property
of some emotive attitudes that is closely analogous to the property of
truth as it pertains to beliefs. 13 Some feelings toward things are to
be the right attitude to take" given their value, just as belief is the
right epistemic attitude to take toward what is true.
The way Brentano introduces the concept of correctness in the
essay is as follows. First he distinguishes three categories of psycho-
logical acts: having ideas or "presentations," making judgments, and
undergoing emotions. The latter two, unlike the former, are said to in-
volve an important type of opposition. In the category of making judg-
ments, this opposition relates affirmation to denial; in the category of
undergoing emotions, it relates love to hate, and being pleased to being
displeased. No opposition is found in the category of having ideas.
Brentano follows those claims with this:
This fact has an important consequence. Psychological acts that be-
long to the first class [having ideas] cannot be said to be correct
or incorrect. But in the case of acts that belong to the second
class [making judgments], one of the two opposing modes of rel a-
tion--affi rmat ion and denial--is correct and the other is incorrect,
as logic has taught since ancient times. Naturally, the same thing
is true in the third class. Of the two opposing types of feeling--
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loving and hating, being pleased and being di spl eased--i n every in-
stance one of them is correct and the other is incorrect.!
5
This passage is immediately followed by the first citation above.
We gain a loose but workable grip upon the concept from this account.
It is valuable to proceed with this degree of understanding, if only in
order to find out where we need more information. I do not see how we
can do better on the basis of texts alone. In the last sections of this
chapter I try to explain the residual unclarity about correctness.
We can now consider the proposal that to be intrinsically good is
to be possibly pleasing in itself, where the pleasure is correctly
taken
,
i .e.
,
D2.5 pis intrinsically good = df. Possibly, there is someone, S,
such that p is pleasing in itself for S, and that p is an ob-
ject of pleasure for S is correct. 16
D2.5 seems to be too weak. For anything that might be overall
good seems to be a possible object of correctly taken pleasure, though
that cannot be definitely established without a fuller account of cor-
rectness. At the beginning of the first passage cited above, Brentano
holds that anything "good" in the "broadest" sense is a possible object
of correctly taken pleasure. It is not clear what is to be that "broad-
est" sense: perhaps it is to be overall goodness, perhaps the disjunc-
tion of intrinsic and extrinsic goodness. But on either reading, some
things that are not intrinsically good would be possible objects of cor-
rectly taken pleasure. For on either reading, intrinsically neutral
overall goods could be objects of correctly taken pleasure. And
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intuitively speaking, if intrinsic goodness makes something a "fit-
ting" or "correct" object of pleasure, then so does overall goodness.
At least it seems that any notion of correctness that excludes that pos-
sibility must be more completely explained. It is also plausible that
an intrinsically indifferent overall good might be pleasing in itself
for someone. So it seems that too much satisfies the definiens of D2.5.
A conceivable defense of D2.5 against this sort of charge consists
in claiming that there are epistemic restrictions on when pleasure taken
in what is somehow good is correct. These requirements might be thought
to get in the way of a non-intri nsic
, overall good being pleasing in it-
self for someone in the appropriate epistemic situation.
But what requirements would work? None that I have found. For
example, it does not help if the person must know that the neutral is
overall good for the pleasure to be correct. Smith might know that
there being radar is overall good, but be unmoved emotionally by that
fact, and by anything he takes to be brought about, preserved, or made
probable by radar. He need be no more than a little bit screwy to feel
glad nonetheless that there is radar. He would then pass the conditions
for it being correctly pleasing to him, and pleasing in intself.
Another modification might seem better. Perhaps we should require
that the pleasing in itself relationship be correct, rather than just
the pleasure taken in the object. Then we have:
D2.6 p is intrinsically good = df. Possibly, there is someone, S
such that p is pleasing in itself for S, and that p is pleas-
ing in itself for S is correct.
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Epi stemic considerations seem actually to work against D2.6. Con-
sider someone who has fine evidence concerning something which is not in
fact intrinsically good. Suppose the person manages to summon up a
pleasurable regard for that thing, and not in virtue of anything else.
Intuitively, that appears to be a "fitting"or "correct" atittude for him
to take. That would refute D2.6, though.
It might be replied that this last example fails to accommodate
Brentano's analogy between correctness and truth. Pleasure under the
described circumstances would be analogous to justified false belief,
and thus not really correct.
The trouble with this reply is that pleasure in itself toward the
intrinsically indifferent overall good seems sufficiently analogous to
true belief to refute D2.6. Now I do not wish to deny that there is a
way to construe "correctness" where only intrinsic goods are possible
objects of a certain sort of "correct" pleasure. 17 But I think we
must conclude that, in the absence of a suitable clarification of the
nature of correctness, the D2.5-D2.6 approach does not appear to suc-
ceed.
C. Analysis by Use of Brentano's Criterion
Just after the first citation above, Brentano writes, "So much for
the concept of the good." 1 ^ But we should not let that discourage us.
Brentano proceeds to offer a criterion for knowing something to be in-
trinsically good. It seems to adapt to yield an account of intrinsic
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goodness, one that appears better equipped to cope with the epistemic
problems that arose above.
Here is his (terse) formulation of the criterion:
... in the case of [pleasure in the clarity of insight] the natur-
al feeling of pleasure is a higher love that is experienced as being
correct. When we ourselves experience such a love we notice not
only that the object is loved and capable of being loved
. . , but
also that it is worthy of being loved ... and therefore that it is
good J9
Here, then, is Brentano's criterion in his own (translator 1 s
)
words :
C2.1 If S has a natural feeling of pleasure toward p and S experi-
ences that feeling as being correct, then p is known by S to
be intrinsically good.
Of course, to understand C2.1 we have to understand what it is for an
emotion to be "experienced as being correct." Brentano tries to explain
that notion by analogy with our knowledge of sel f-warranted proposi-
tions. He begins by contrasting "blind" or "impulsive" judgments with
"insightful" or "evident" ones, where examples of the latter are to
include belief in the law of non-contradiction and our knowledge of our
own perceptual states. After noting that the difference between the two
kinds of judgments is not a matter of degree of conviction, he writes:
If one were to ask [concerning an immediately evident belief] ‘Why
do you really believe that?' ... it would be impossible to find
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rational grounds
. . . but
. . . the clarity of the judgment is such
as to enable us to see that the question has no point
. .
.21
Brentano then asserts:
. .
. [there is] an analogous distinction between the higher and
lower types of activity in the emotional sphere
. . ..there is a
higher mode of being pleased ... it is the analog of something
being evident in the sphere of judgment. 22
Apparently, Brentano holds that "experiencing pleasure as being
correct" amounts to being immediately aware of having a "higher love,"
where the obvious presence of the emotion parallels the "clarity" of the
judgement, and the height of the emotion constitutes its correctness.
What is this elevated type of pleasure, this "higher love"? Brentano
does not further identify it. The best construal seems to be that he
means to refer to some species of liking that is the intuitive opposite
to "blind" or unreflect ive favoring, something like contemplative ap-
proval. The reading of C2.1 this suggests is:
C2. 1 a If it is self-evident to S that S is feeling contemplative ap-
proval for p, then p is known by S to be intrinsically good.
We can take "self-evident" in an intuitive sense for now, and take
it for granted that this sort of approval is self-evident to the one who
feels it. It is plain that C2. 1 a is not a credible criterion, nor does
it give us a plausible equivalence with intrinsic goodness. First, a
brief consideration of the variety of attitudinal propensities that ob-
tain should convince us that not only intrinsic goods are objects of the
"exalted" approval of C2. 1 a (or any other kind of attitude). And of
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course the attitude will be self-evidently present when addressed to-
ward something not intrinsically good, too. Second, on this interpre-
tatation the high-toned nature of the feeling constitutes the correct-
ness of the emotion. Yet C2.1a has it that correct (i.e., high-grade)
approval attaches only to what is i ntri nsical ly good. This makes it
very hard to understand how Brentano could consistently say that any-
thing good in the "broadest" sense can be correctly loved, as he does in
the first quote above. This strongly suggests that we should seek a
better interpretation of "experiencing pleasure as being correct."
Fortunately, a better reading is available. It is given added
credence by part of a letter from Brentano to Oscar Kraus. Brentano
there attempts to say how we acquire the concept of correctness. He
claims that we do it by observing several emotive acts that exemplify it
and seeing it as something they have in common. Then he writes:
We know with immediate evidence that certain of our emotive atti-
tudes are correct. ... We will find that there are others whose
emotive attitudes correspond to our own. ... If their attitudes
should happen to be only a matter of habit or instinct we may still
say that they are correct but not that they are experienced as being
correct. . . . One can never find the criterion of correctness in an
adaequatio rei et intellectus vel amoris
,
it can be found only in
those attitudes which we know with immediate evidence to be cor-
rect . 23
The interpretation that is thereby made reasonable reads "experi-
encing pleasure as being correct" to mean making a sel f-warranti ng
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judgment that the pleasure is correct. So we get:
C2.1b If S feels contemplative approval for p and it is self-evident
for S that it is correct for S to feel that way about p, then
p is known by S to be intrinsically good.
We should have a somewhat precise notion of self-evidence to work with.
But first let us get before us the thing that is our principal concern
in this chapter: the equivalence with intrinsic goodness suggested by
the criterion. Of course we must not suppose that each intrinsic good
is actually an object of approval. But if we make the reasonable as-
sumption that C2. lb is necessarily true if true at all, then if C2.1b is
correct only intrinsic goods can satisfy its conditions. And it seems
safe to say that if any can, then they all can. So here is our new ana-
lyzing proposal:
D2.7 p is intrinsically good = df. Possibly, there is a person,
S, such that S feels contemplative approval for p, and it is
self-evident for S that it is correct for S to feel that way
about p.
It will be harmless and helpful to use this concept of self-
evidence:
D2.8 p is self-evident for S = df if p is true; p is evident for S;
and for any q such that q makes p evident for s, q entail s^4
P-
Roughly, D2.8 permits only p itself and conjunctions of p with other
things evident for S to make p evident when p is sel f-evident.^
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There is trouble for D2.7. Recall that being "good" in the
broadest" sense 1 s to be a necessary condition for being an object of
correctly taken pleasure. But can what is self-evident for a person
ever guarantee that something is "good" in that sense? If not, it could
not be self-evident that a state passes this requironent of "broad"
goodness for being an object of correct pleasure. And that would be a
barrier to the correctness itself being self-evident. "Broadest" good-
ness cannot be self-evident if the sense of "good" in question is that
of being overal 1 good. The state's causal contributions cannot be self-
evident, and they must be known to determine its overall value status.
If instead the broadest" sense is that of being either intrinsically or
extri ns ic al 1 y good, then there is no obvious problem here. If D2.7 is
right, then something that it contends can be self-evident implies the
intrinsic goodness of the state at stake. So the necessary condition on
this reading of "good" would automatical ly be met.
But this latter reading creates another problem: Is it really
correct to contemplatively approve of something intrinsically good but
disasterous in its consequences? If not, there would be no way for the
correctness of the approval to be self-evident. And it seems not. I
think there _i_s a reading making such approval of an intrinsic good "cor-
rect." But it brings to light considerations that make grave trouble
for the whole D2.7 approach. So I want to postpone that to try some-
thing else that is a reasonable interpretation and does not directly
raise that problem. The point right here is that the meager intuitions
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that are apparently good ones to use given Brentano's account of
correctness make it doubtful that approval can be self-evidently
correct
.
It may be that the sort of "love" that Brentano intends in his
comments about the "broadest" sense of "good" does not include the
pleasing in itself variety. Such a consideration led us to D2.6, which
seemed to fail essentially because of the possibility of misleading evi-
dence. But the self-evidence requirement of the D2.7 approach might
well help with the problematic sort of epistemic situation. In order
also to accommodate the notion of "higher love," we can concoct the
phrase approved in itself," where p is so approved just when contempla-
tively approved, and not in virtue of anything else.
Now we can have:
D2.9 p is intrinsically good = df. Possibly, there is someone, S,
such that p is approved in itself by S, and that p being so
approved is correct is self-evident for S.
The concept of being approved in itself is supposed to capture the idea
of being approved "for its own sake," approved "for what it is, rather
than what it does." To the extent that what is intuitive in those
phrases is captured, it seems more reasonable in the case of D2.9 than
in that of D2.7 to say that such approval of something intrinsically
good is "correct" whether or not the thing is overall good. Thus D2.9
seems to make a more credible demand on what can be self-evident than
D2.7.
D2.9 is an interesting equivalence. I see no example that clearly
refutes it. It is not manifest whether what it requires to be self-
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evident really can be. I think determining that goes beyond the rough
intuitions about correctness to be gained from Brentano's comments about
it. But I see some reasonable temptation to say that we could determine
the relevant correctness by inspection alone. What I take to account
for that temptation
, however, ultimately undermines D2.9.
It is time to improve our understanding of correctness.
Brentano's analogy of correctness to truth lead us to try to take it to
be a one place property. I believe there is no such concept of correct-
ness. I suggest that what is meant by the kind of use of "correct" in-
tended in D2.9 is a relation. 26 Other locutions, clearly synonymous
with "correct" in many contexts, are always expressions for relations.
When the topic is the evaluation of actions, it is merely a question of
terminology whether we say that an action is "proper" or "correct." Yet
a relational sense is intended. An action can be "proper" in one re-
spect and not "proper" in another. If Jones knows that only by breaking
rudely into a conversation between Smith and Robinson can Robinson be
spared a painful revelation, then it might be that Jones should do it.
If so, then the act would be both proper (or correct) and improper (or
incorrect). For it would be morally proper and improper etiquette.
Such an example can show us that "proper" and "correct" at least often
express relations where one term is not explicitly mentioned. Context
typically determines what it is.
It might be thought obvious that "correct" sometimes expresses a
one place property. We say that a belief is "correct" and seem to mean
that it is true. But even there, I think our precise meaning is that
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the belief is correct with regard to its truth value. Note that true
beliefs are also "incorrect" when they are politically forbidden. 1
propose that a relation is always expressed.
One immediate benefit of that view is the easy explanation it pro-
vides for our trouble in being satisfactorily clear about what Brentano
meant by "correct." Since he makes no mention of what it is in relation
to which the pleasure is to be correct, and since his analogy with truth
stifles any attempt to be guided by context, it is no wonder we had a
hard time deciding important questions about its application. The case
is analogous to that of being told that there is a notion of usefulness
which is much like truth, and then being told that a certain interesting
category of things are "useful" in that sense. It is likely that con-
text would help somewhat in determining what purpose the things were to
be useful for. But the analogy and the absence of explicit relata would
allow us at best only a rough understandi ng . 27
If "correct" expresses a relation in D2.9, relative to what is the
approval to be self-evidently correct? Familiar terms like moral status
and truth value clearly will not do. In the former case, consequent!' al
-
ists have it that there is no way for the moral status of an act of ap-
proval to be self-evident. They say it is determined by a feature of
the act that contemplation cannot reveal: the value of its consequences
versus the value of its alternatives' consequences. It is more diffi-
cult to speak for all non-consequential i sts on this question, but any
plausible moral theory will have it be possibly morally correct for an
intrinsic neutral to be approved in itself by someone. After all, it is
42
a harmless and pleasant mental episode under most conditions. And if it
can be self-evidently moral to do this approving in the case of an in-
trinsic good, it is reasonable to suppose that it can also be so in the
case of an intrinsic neutral. But then the neutral satisfies the moral
status rel ati vi sation of D2.9. So D2.9 fails. The truth value sort of
correctness makes D2.9 amount to this: pis intrinsically good just
when it is possible that it is self-evident for some S that p is ap-
proved in itself by S. The point about the unrestricted application of
attitudes shows that that is wrong. Any state might be approved in it-
self, and approving can be self-evidently directed toward non-i ntri nsi c
goods just as well as toward intrinsic goods.
A rel at i vi sation that does not seem open to counterexamples has it
that the approving is self-evidently correct with regard to the value
status of the thing approved. Not overall value status. As already
mentioned, it cannot be self-evident that one is approving an overall
good. D2.9 is most plausibly held to lack counterinstances when the ap-
proving is to be self-evidently correct with regard to the intrinsic
value status of the approved. Here is a principle to which I have no
objection:
P2.1 Necessarily, p is intrinsically good iff possibly, p is ap-
proved in itself by someone, and that approval is correct
with regard to the intrinsic value status of p.
Perhaps in the case of each intrinsic good it is possible that it be
self-evident for someone that that person's approval in itself of the
intrinsic good is correct with regard to its intrinsic value status. I
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see no good way to argue that that cannot be. If it can, then the fol-
lowing equivalence would seem to be acceptable as well:
P2.2 Necessarily, p is intrinsically good iff possibly, someone, S,
is such that p is approved in itself by S, and that p being
approved in itself by S i s correct with regard to the intrin-
sic value status of p is self-evident to S.
P2.1 and P2.2 merit contemplation. P2.1 embodies the intuition that a
certain high-minded liking of a state for its own sake is appropriate to
the value status of the intrinsic goods only. P2.2 embodies the addi-
tional intuition that this liking can show itself to accord with the
value status.
But these cannot be analyses. What is the concept of the intrin-
sic value status of a thing? It is the concept of its intrinsic good-
ness, neutrality, or evil. So D2.9 is rendered circular by use of that
concept.
D. The Requirement Interpretation of Correctness
There is a last interpretation of correctness that we should try.
Perhaps the approval is to be self-evidently correct "with respect to
its object." This tells us that Jones contemplatively approving of
Smith being happy would be correct with respect to Smith being happy
itself. Can we make sense of this? I think so, if we take this kind of
correctness to be the relation of a thing being fitting for something,
or we use its converse--the relation of requirement. At times, Brentano
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characterizes correctness in terms of fi ttingness.28 Examples by
Chisholm help to clarify the idea:
. .
. promise-making requires--or calls for--promi se-keepi ng
; being
virtuous, according to Kant, requires being rewarded; the dominant
seventh requires the chord of the tonic; one color in the lower left
calls for a complementary color in the upper right. 29
It has been proposed tht we sometimes "experience" requirements.
Maurice Mandelbaum holds the relation to create the basis for felt moral
demands; he holds that we then experience a requi rement by a situation
for an action. 20 So this sort of correctness might have the requisite
possible self-evidence.
Thus we ought to consider this proposition:
D2.10 p is intrinsically good = df. Possibly there is someone, S,
to whom it is self-evident that p requires p being contempla-
tively approved by S.
D2.10 has commendable features. If, as Pl.l says, it is appropri-
ate to the value status of intrinsic goods to contemplatively approve of
them, and, as PI. 2 says, this might be seen by considering whether such
affection is required, so much the better for D2.10 as well as P2.1 and
P2.2. Intuition might reveal that overall good intrinsic neutrals can
be fittingly favored when seen as such. But it cannot be self-evident
that the neutral has the requisite extrinsic credentials to be overall
good. So such neutrals seem not to satisfy D2.10.
Finally, though, it seems to me that there is trouble for D2.10.
And it is of a sort that appears to undermine any pleasure-based
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analysis of intrinsic goodness. The difficulty can be brought out by
asking what really makes us think that pleasure is especially appro-
priately taken in things having positive value. Contingently associated
influences like moral indoctrination aside, the degree to which the ex-
perience is enjoyable does not depend upon the value of its object. No
degree of pleasure logically or psychologically requires a good object.
What does make the apparent fit, then?
First, I contend that there is no such fittingness that is present
in the case of every sort of liking. Consider:
D2.ll p is intrinsically good = df. Possibly there is someone, S,
such that it is self-evident for S that p requires p being
1 ustful ly thrill i ng to S.
D2.ll is not plausible. Why? It is more difficult to thrill lustfully
in certain lofty states than to contemplatively approve of them. But I
believe that that is a distraction which does not really account for the
intuitive difference. In brief, I think what explains the special suit-
ability of the "high" pleasures is that each implies a belief that its
object is somehow good. This is clear in the case of taking pride, ad-
miring, and appreciating. I think it is also quite plain in the case of
the lofty emotion we have been usi ng--contemplati ve approval. In fact,
approval is always approval out of regard for some (believed) feature of
the object of approval, where the object is believed thereby to be some-
how good.
Now we should ask--What sort of goodness is ascribed to p on the
most credible construal of D2.10? Perhaps some intrinsic goods are
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aesthetically good, and they require approval out of aesthetic regard
for them. But not all intrinsic goods. Only approval out of regard for
--
ntrinsic g° odn ess seems exactly fitting for all and only intrinsic
goods. So the precisely stated equivalence that intuition actually
favors is:
£. is intrinsical ly good = df. Possibly, there is someone, S,
such that it is self-evident for S that p requires p being
contemplatively approved by S out of regard for p's intrinsic
goodness.
If, as I believe, this is the best "requi rement" account that is finally
intuitively acceptable, then we have not improved upon D2.9 on its best
reading after all. Obviously D2.12 too is circular.
As I see it, the general situation concerning pi easure-based an-
alyses of intrinsic goodness is this: No more fit can be seen in the
sheer taking of pleasure in an intrinsic good than in the same attitude
toward an intrinsic neutral. There _is_ a special appropriateness to cer-
tain sorts of pleasure in the intrinsic goods--the sorts with an impli-
cation of believed goodness. But when we think narrowly and sharply
about just when these attitudes seem precisely called for, we see that
it is when they involve recognition of the intrinsic goodness of their
objects. 31 To identify exactly the required attitudes in our equiva-
lence, we must use the concept of intrinsic goodness on both sides.
Thus such equivalences may be interesting, but as analyses they are
circular.
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CHAPTER III
PLEASURE AND THE DISCOVERY OF INTRINSIC GOODNESS
The question here is whether pleasure can help us learn which
things are 1 ntn nsical ly good. A proposal according to which pleasure
does just that is one of the most significant assertions in Brentano's
Th e Origin of Our Knowledge of Righ t and Wrong
, as was mentioned
above. 1 We must study that proposal here. Charles Baylis has also
offered a pleasure-based criterion of intrinsic goodness that merits our
consideration. 2 So we will give it that.
A. Tests for Epistemic Principles
How is an epistemic test for intrinsic goodness to be tested? The
form of such a proposal seems best understood to be:
p E's q being intrinsically good,
where "E" stands for expressions of propositional support relations such
as tending to confirm and justifying, 2 and "p" expresses some condi-
tion involving pleasure. Since we would most like to find a way that
intrinsic goods can be discovered in the first place, p should state
something that is intuitively possibly evident without any other evi-
dence about intrinsic goodness (in contrast with testimonial evidence
from an expert, for example, where we would need other evidence about
intrinsic goodness to discern his expertise). And the proposal will not
allay doubts about evidence for intrinsic goodness if it appeals to a
condition less well justifiable than the proposition that q is
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intrinsically good. Finally, such a criterion is unsatisfactory if it
is satisfiable by a diversity of q's that are not intrinsically good on
any plausible value theory, unless it is supplemented by an account
showing how to exclude those. The principle is not shown false by being
thusly satisfied, since there is such a thing as misleading evidence.
But without a way to narrow down at least to things controversially re-
garded as intrinsically good, we have no reason to believe that it is
even guiding us toward the intrinsic goods.
B. Brentano 1 s Criterion
Unfortunately, Brentano is quite brief on the topic of a test for
intrinsic goodness. The relevant passages were all cited in Chapter
II. 4 Here is the statement of the test itself again:
... in the case of [pleasure in the clarity of insight] the natur-
al feeling of pleasure is a higher love which is experienced as be-
ing correct. When we ourselves experience such a love we notice not
only that the object is loved and capable of being loved . . . but
also that it is worthy of being loved . . . and therefore that it is
[intrinsical ly] good. 5
To reiterate briefly the i nterprtations of Chapter 1,6 "being correct"
seems best read to express the relation of fittingness, to "experience
[the fit] as being correct" seems best read to assert the fit to be
sel fevident
,
and the pleasure which is "a higher love" seems best read
as contemplative approval . In pursuit of an analysis of intrinsic good-
ness, these readings lead us to:
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D2 ' 12 £-ls i ntrinsicall_^
_good = df. Possibly, there is someone, S,
such that it is self-evident for S that p requires p being
contemplatively approved by S out of regard for p's intrinsic
goodness.
For all the critical comments of Chapter II show, the left and
right sides of D2.12 may be necesssarily equivalent. I have no objec-
tion to that equivalence. Our question here, though, is whether we can
extract from D2.12 evidence involving pleasure for intrinsic goodness.
We could approach that question by considering whether the right side of
D2.12 evidentially supports the left, i.e.:
E3.1 It being self-evident for some S that p requires p being con-
templatively approved by S out of regard for p's intrinsic
goodness tends to confirm that p is intrinsical ly good.
But I think that E3.1 is not the best epistemic principle that can be
gotten from 02.12. We seek evidence for intrinsic goodness which can be
at least as secure epi stemical ly as the belief that the thing in ques-
tion is i ntr i ns ic al 1 y good can be. I do not see how to demonstrate
this, but it seems clear that the self-evidence of the relevant require-
ment cannot be as well warranted as the intrinsic goodness alone might
be. For the former seems to depend on evidence for the intrinsic good-
ness and for the presence of the requirement and its self-evidence.
Also, recognizing that approval out of regard for intrinsic goodness is
called for seems to depend upon having used other evidence to discern
the intrinsic goodness. So it appears that seeing the requirement could
not be our means for gaining i nitial warrant for the intrinsic
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goodness. ? I think we do better by turning our attention to:
E3.2 S contemplatively approving of p out of regard for p's intrin-
sic goodness tends to confirm that p is intrinsically good.
In any case, the trouble attributed to E3.2 below seems at least as
serious a problem in the case of E3.1, so we do Brentano no disservice
by concentrating on E3.2. E3.2 has the distinct advantage that its jus-
tifying condition is plainly capable of the highest possible degree of
justification for S. (Recall that the approval is to be out of regard
for what is taken to be p's intrinsic goodness.)
We should note concerning E3.2 that its jusitfying condition uses
the very concept the application of which it is to justify. That raises
once again the unwholesome spectre of circularity. But use of the con-
cept in question is not an objectionable feature of justification prin-
ciples. For instance, the use of the concept of being an ovoid egg is
innocuous here:
(a) All eggs in a large random sample being ovoid tends to confirm
that all eggs are ovoid.
For another example, that I seem to see something white justifies
itself. Indeed, the fact of self-justification shows that some justi-
fies flagrantly require the justified to be evidence for the justifies
So the circularity that ruins an analysis is not an objectionable trait
here. The most similar feature that j_s a flaw in an epistemic principle
is its presupposing other evidence for the justified of at least equal
strength to the evidence it is supposed to supply. That is the fault
that spoils this:
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(b) Someone knowing that some suits are worsted wool tends to con-
firm that some suits are worsted wool.
E3.2 does not give any sign of being flawed in that way.
On the other hand, whenever S approves of p out of regard for p's
(believed) intrinsic goodness, S thinks of the proposition that p is
intrinsically good. And it seems that intrinsic goods might be self-
evidently so. That is, perhaps:
E3.3 If p is intrinsically good, then possibly, for some S, it is
self-evident for S that p is intrinsically good.
If E3.3 is true, then we ought to doubt that pleasure is playing any ep-
i stemical ly useful role in E3.2. S may be getting all the evidence for
p's intrinsic goodness from the thought that p is intrinsically good it-
self. Pleasure would then have no greater epistemic function in E3.2
than it does in:
(c) Jones taking pleasure in his seeming to see the door closed
tends to confirm that the door is closed.
Clearly, the seeming to see supplies all the epistemic oomf in (c). We
can tell that this is so by noting the truth of (c), the falsity of:
(d) Jones taking pleasure in the door being closed tends to con-
firm that the door is closed.,
and that the justifier in (c) is no better support for the door being
closed than is the seeming to see by itself, i.e.,:
(e) Jones seeming to see the door closed tends to confirm that the
door is closed.
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H°W anal °90US are E3 ‘ 2 ^ E3.3 to (c) and ( e)7 Roughly speak-
ing,8 I find E3.2 and E3.3 equally plausible. No consideration seems
to differentiate their credibility decisively. If there is no such con-
sideration, then however reasonable E3.2 is, it does not give evidence
that pleasure plays a more important role in the discovery of intrinsic
goodness than it does in the discovery of closed doors. (It should be
acknowledged that this epistemic equivalence between E3.2 and E3.3 seems
subject to rough estimate only. It is by no means obvious what, if any-
thing, satisfies either. And this is so despite the fact that neither
uses intolerably unclear terms.)
We must not conclude from this equivalence that the pleasure in
E3.2 does not help to justify p being intrinsically good. That would be
to employ a principle relevantly like:
E3.4 If A and B epistemically supports C to exactly the same degree
as B does, then A does not support C.
To see the error in E3.4 we need do no more than consider a case where A
both contains support for C of the same strength as B, and contains evi-
dence that discounts B. For example, let A = Jones seems to hear a door
close and seems to remember the expert telling him that if he seems to
see a door close, that is a hallucination; B = Jones seems to hear a
door close; and C = A door is closed.
What we are entitled to say at this point about E3.2 and E3.3 is
that, given their equal plausibility and the inclusion of E 3. 3 ' s evi-
dence in E3.2, we have no reason yet to believe that pleasure plays a
significant role in the discovery of intrinsic goodness. Pleasure would
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be shown to be of special help in determining intrinsic goodness if
pleasures not taken in consideration of intrinsic goodness (i.e., pleas-
ures not implying that one think of p being intrinsically good) can be
shown to give evidence for intrinsic goodness. Then there would be
nothing analogous to (d)'s falsehood to complete the parallel to the ex-
hibition of the irrelevance of the pleasure in (c). Charles Baylis has
offered an epsitemic principle of just the right sort.
C. Baylis's Criterion
Baylis seeks an "identifying property" for intrinsic goodness:
... a discoverable characteristic the presence of which is a reli-
able sign of the intrinsic goodness of that thing.
9
Here is his proposal:
When we judge certain things, e.g., pleasant experiences, to be in-
trinsically good, the best initial evidence we could have, I submit,
is that we find ourselves prizing things of that kind, i.e., liking,
approving, desiring, preferri ng and commending them, for their own
qualities (rather than for their relations to other valuable things)
in circumstances where to the best of our searching knowledge we are
making no mistake in our cognition of them. Such evidence gives us
an initial probability that we thus prize is intrinsically good JO
If "the best of our searching knowledge" can include evidence
about the intrinsic value status of the thing in question, then it may
be the "circumstances" rather than the "prizing" that does the epistemic
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This is clearly not the intended interpretation. Bayl i s suggests
that the principal sorts of errors to avoid are to be evaded by:
(i) attending explicitly to the thing's believed extrinsic value
and discounting it,
( 1
1
) focusi
n
9 carefully on the thing and other cases of the same
sort, and
(ni) avoiding risky perceptual conditions like being tired or
drunk, impassioned or prejudiced.^
Let us call a sincere effort to do these things "taking normal precau-
tions." We do not have to find out anything about intrinsic value to
take normal precautions; we will let doing so constitute "the best of
our searching knowledge." And we will avoid approving and other sorts
of "prizing" that imply believed goodness by appealing to liking only.
Finally, we will use the concept of being pleasing in itself from Chap-
ter 11^2 as our rendition of ".
. . liking . . . for their own quali-
ties." Then Bayl i
s
1
s view becomes:
E3.5 p being pleasing in itself to someone who is taking normal
precautions tends to confirm that p is intrinsically good.
E3.5 is unacceptable. Its justifying condition has no tendency to
be met by intrinsic goods in particular. A survey of the things that
people spontaneously like would largely turn up undisputed intrinsic
neutrals such as the rustling of autumn leaves, tickling sensations, the
appearance of a flawless, polished chromium surface in bright light, and
the feeling of extreme dizziness. These neutrals are at least as apt to
be pleasing in themselves as intrinsic goods, and taking normal
precaut ions doss not affsct that
appreciably better.
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I see no variation on E3.5 that does
Someone might ask, "Would not a closer look at what people in
these conditions find pleasing in itself reveal that it is really the
pleasure taken
, rather than its object? Hence, are not these examples
all cases where the hedonist's view of intrinsic goods is confirmed?"
My best efforts at introspecting the phenomena in question tell me
that this objection is in error. For instance, I like the taste of
fresh ripe peaches. That taste is an elaborate gustatory and olfactory
experience which I find I do not like because of anything it causes or
makes likely. I enjoy eating peaches because that brings on pleasant
experiences. But the taste itself does not please me in virtue of any
extrinsic consideration--! just like it.
Perhaps Baylis was misled into thinking that E3.4 has merit by an
ambiguity in "pleasant experience." The things that satisfy E3.5's jus-
tifying condition are called "pleasant experiences" because they are ex-
periential states in which pleasure is taken. They are objects of plea-
sure at times, and, signi ficantly, those times include any occasion on
which E3.5 s justifying condition is met. On all such occasions the
other rel evant sense of "pleasant experience" also applies to something
in the vici nity--the prizings themselves can be called that, too. But
they are not what is then satisfying E3.5. Doing that is not even a
"reliable sign" that something is a "pleasant experience" in this latter
sense (nor that it is anything else credibly taken as intrinsically
good)
.
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D. Removing Remain ing Apparent Disanaloqies
We can move closer than E3.5 gets to the justifying condition in
E3.2 without using something that involves thinking of p being intrin-
sically good, thus strengthening the analogy to the case of the closed
door. We can try:
E3.6 p being contemplatively approved by someone out of regard for
some believed feature of p or other tends to confirm that p is
i ntrinsical ly good.
E3.6 is no better than E3.5, though. Smith saying "Please" in the
course of making a request can be contemplatively approved as good man-
ners; Robinson using dynamite as an example of an explosive can be con-
templatively approved as a good example. The only ways to modify E3.6
that seem better than it bring back the thought of p's intrinsic good-
ness as the basis for the approval
. So the analogy to the epistemic ir-
rel evance of pleasure in (c) seems to be further borne out.
A last putative disanalogy between pleasure in the intrinsic good-
ness evidence principle E3.2 and pleasure in the door closure principle
(c) should be discussed. There is a lingering temptation to find E3.2
better than E3.3 (while there is no such temptation to prefer (c) to
(e)). I think that intuition can be explained in a way that gives plea-
sure no evidential role in learning of intrinsic goodness. Contempla-
tive approval out of regard for intrinsic goodness is closely correlated
with focusing upon and attending to the proposition that the thing in
question is i ntri nsical ly good in search of intrinsic goodness-
conferring features of it. This correlated concentration may provide
60
evidence for p's intrinsic goodness which is superior to that provided
by simply thinking of p being intrinsically good in some casual fashion.
But even if so, this is certainly not evidence from pleasure itself. We
can replicate any such advantage of E3.2 with:
E3.7 S giving careful consideration to whether p is intrinsically
good while taking normal precautions and believing p to be in-
trinsically good on the basis of such reflections tends to
confirm that p is intrinsically good.
E3.7 makes no use of pleasure. Yet it achieves the focusing effect in
question at least as well as E3.2. If we use E3.7 instead of E3.3 as
the analog to (d) in the case of the closed door, the analogy seems com-
plete. The conclusion that pleasure in E3.2 is epi stemical ly superflu-
ous now looks inescapable.
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evident by D2.8, then so might be the requi rement as a whole, even
though it depends on something other than itself (i.e., its entailment
that p is intrinsically good) for evidence of p's intrinsic goodness.
8See section D below for a modified version of E3.2 that may be
more reasonably held to be epi stemical ly equivalent to E3.3.
9Baylis, p. 493.
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11 Ibid., p. 495
12 See Chapter II, D2.2 and Note 9.
CHAPTER iv
PLEASURE AND THE POSSESSION OF INTRINSIC GOODNESS
This chapter has two major parts. In the first. I discuss in some
detail problems that arise in formulating a clear and thorough hedonis-
tic theory. That part naturally divides into (a) problems in identify-
ing the hedonists' basic bearers of value (sections A and C below) and
(b) problems in distributing the proper values to indefinitely complex
states of affairs on the basis of any given identification of basics
(section B below). The second main section of the chapter concerns se-
lected objections to any version of hedonism. The first objection (sec-
tion D below) is an argument by Brentano for the claim that pleasures
cannot be the only intrinsic goods. The other objections considered are
Broad s contention that malice shows not all pleasures are intrinsically
good (section E below), and Moore's beauty objection (section F below).
A. First Attempts to Formulate Hedonism
What is hedonism? That seems easy to answer. We can use Moore's
succinct formulation: "Pleasure alone is [intrinsically] good."! But
which doctrine is that? It seems to say that there is one item--
pl easure--whi ch is the sole thing having positive intrinsic value.
Surely, though, hedonists wish to hold that any of the many pleasing ex-
periences is intrinsically good. That suggests the statement: All and
only pleasant experiences are intrinsically good . 2 That is not quite
right either. For many persons, tasting an ice-cream sundae is a
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pleasant experience. Yet hedonists do not attribute intrinsic value to
events of tasting. They hold that the pleasure of the taste is the in-
trinsic good in the experience, not the taste that is its object. But
still, every case of taking pleasure is to count, not just the pleasure
taking relation itself. So instances of taking pleasure—which we shall
understand here to be states of affairs—are good candidates for the
hedonist's bearers of intrinsic goodness. We can put the view by say-
ing: All and only pleasure-states are intrinsically good. But we must
not leave the formulation that vague. We have to attach a clear meaning
to "pleasure-states." (The "hedonism" in question is not to be confused
with an implausible doctrine about America's sun-and-fun spots— FI orida
,
California, and Hawaii.) Here is a proposal:
D4»l p is a pleasure-state = df necessarily, if p obtains, then
someone is pleased.
D4.1 captures all the episodes that a hedonist wants, and a rich assort-
ment of others. For now, 3 we can assume that hedonists would be after
states like:
(a) Jones being pleased,
or
(b) Jones being pleased about Smith's good fortune,
or perhaps
(c) Jones being pleased to intensity 5 for 4 seconds at quality
level 6 about Smith's good fortune.
D4.1, though, also embraces states such as:
(d) Jones being pleased and Smith being displeased,
(e) Jones being pleased during a bowling escapade,
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and
(f) Someone being pleased.
(d) is no hedonist's idea of an intrinsic good; (e) and (f) mig ht be
counted intrinsically good by a hedonist, but only by deriving their in-
trinsic value from the fundamental bearers of hedonistic value that we
now seek to capture, the "pleasure-states."
A better attempt to select out the right states is:
04,2 gjs a pleasure-state = df (i ) possibly, there is exactly one
x such that necessarily, p obtainss iff (a) x is pleased, and
(b) necessarily, for all q, if q strictly implies that x is
pleased, then q implies p. (In other words, p implies a cer-
tain person to be pleased, and anything that implies that per-
son to be pleased implies p.)
One counterexample to D4.2 is:
(g) Jones being pleased or 7 plus 5 equaling 75.
This objection seems surmountable by appeal to Chisholm's concept of in-
volvement. 4 Intuitively, what we want here is the narrowest state of
affairs attributing pleasure to Jones. That seems to be the one which,
unlike (g), is involved in all the rest that make that attribution:
D4«3 p is a pleasure-state = df. Possibly, there is exactly one x
such that necessarily, p obtains iff (a) x is pleased, and
(b) for all q, if q strictly implies that x is pleased, then q
involves p.
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D4.3 achieves its intended objective oniy if a certain fairiy dubious
metaphysical proposition is true. Perhaps there are "individual es-
iff necessarily, x alone in-
satiates e). Any entity would have .any of these. For example, Jones
would have one we can call "iel" and the property of being the iel and
such that there might be wolves (or, in the unlikely event that iel is
just that property, being the iel or not such that there might be
wolves). Now, for any individual essence of Jones, iej, necessarily, if
Jones is pleased, then the iej is pleased. Thus if there
_[s a single
proposition involved in each that implies him to be pleased, then Jones
must have a "core essence": c is a core essence of x iff (i) c is an
individual essence of x and (ii) necessarily, if there are S, p, and F,
such that S thinks of p and p strictly implies x to have F, then S
grasps c. That each individual has a core essence is the dubious meta-
physical proportion implied by 04.3. For if not, then there are two
propositions such that each attributes being pleasing to the one who has
what is in fact an individual essence of Jones, while neither involves
the other.
Should we press on in our search for a rigorous account of
pi eas ure-states ? It might seem a misguided project. Consider this
complaint: Suppose you tell us just which are the 1 pi easure-states. 1
What good will that be in formulating hedonism? Presumably, we will be
offered
:
(H) p is intrinsically good iff p is a pleasure-state.
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The trend exemplified in D4.1-D4.3 tells us that this will be a theory
of nearly nugatory interest. Think of what we want a theory of intrin
sic value for. At least, we want it to provide a value rating of alter-
natives for the sake of a thorough formulation of utilitarianism. But
any half-decent formulation of such a theory-Fel dman' s MO. Bergstrom's
T4--requires evaluating such things as the causal consequences of whole
courses of action or whole possible worlds. H rules all such things to
be worthless!"
That vigorously advanced objection is not entirely lacking in ra-
tional force. But it is not at all clear that the hedonist must assign
intrinsic goodness to complex states of affairs in order to rank them on
hedonistic principles. There might be a good way to explain the ranking
in terms of pleasure-states "contained" in such wholes. This would be a
complicated business, no doubt, in the case of some of the purposes we
would like a value theory to serve. For example, we might want a hedon-
istic theory of which actions are, on a given agent's evidence, in that
agent's best interest. That would require appeal to the hedonistic
value of what the agent's evidence attests to being the outcome of what
that evidence purports to be the agent's available acts. Such outcomes
will ordinarily include ineliminable disjunctions such as:
(h) Jones being amused or bemused.
Since the evidence in some cases does not determine which of (h)'s dis-
juncts will obtain, (h) itself must be evaluated. Unlike conjunctions
involving pleasure-states, there is no manifest promising sense to be
made of such states "containing" pleasure-states that "sum" to the
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hedonistic value of the whole,
cover that sort of territory?
How, then, can hedonism be expanded to
Recent philosophical developments give grounds for hope about the
pleasure-state approach to these things. Warren quinn initiated the
work. His "Theories of Intrinsic Value" offers a means to assign the
"night" intrinsic value to complex states on the basis of pre-determiend
evaluations of "basic" or "atomic" ones.5 Edward 01dfield provided a
much improved version of Quinn's theory in "An Approach to a Theory of
Intrinsic Value. "6 That work seems to supply just what is needed
here- -a way to generate values for indefinitely complex states out of
the values for pleasure-states. As will be seen though, even Oldfield's
development of the theory is not satisfactory as it stands. The order
of business here, then, is to examine that work, see whether the mechan-
ism for assigning value can be perfected, then see whether there are
ways to explicate pleasure-state" that allow various versions of
hedonism to "plug into" the resulting machinery.
B. The Qui nn-01 dfi el d Approach
I think I cannot improve upon Oldfield's summary of Quinn's view:
[H]is theory is based on a primitive predicate 'basic proposition.'
No basic proposition entails any other basic proposition. Basic
propositions come in families, that is, sets whose members are mutu-
ally exclusive but jointly exhaustive. A proposition is not indif-
ferent to a family of basics iff it is compatible with some members
and not with others. On the basis of the notion of indifference,
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value constituents are assigned to every proposition. A value con -
—
1tuent 0f a Pr°P°si tion p is a conjunction of propositions which
first, is compatible with p and second, contains one member from
every family to which p is not indifferent. Propositions which have
more than one value constituent are indeterminate
. All other propo-
sitions are determ^^ The intrinsic value of a determinate
p is
calculated at a world. If p is not true at w, its intrinsic value
at w = 0. If p is true at w, its intrinsic value at w is equal to
the sum of the intrinsic values of the basic propositions which are
conjuncts of that value constituent of p which is true at w . J
Quinn's characterization of which are to be "basic" propositions
is promising: A basic proposition ".
. . locates a specific sentient
individual along an evaluatively relevant dimension such as happiness,
virtue, wisdom, etc. ^ That sounds like just what we have been seek-
ing as " pi easure- states. " We will leave aside the question of what
these really are, 9 and we will follow Quinn and Oldfield in taking ex-
pressions such as "J5" and "J-8" to abbvreviate basics of five units of
positive and eight units of negative intrinsic value respectively.
How is Quinn's theory supposed to work? Consider:
(j) J-l and K2.
First we must find the families to which (j) is not indifferent. Fami-
lies, according to Quinn, are sets such as the J's = [ J-2, J-l, JO,
Jl, J2,..., J does not exist (this last member to ensure that the J's
are exhaustive )]. A little thought enables us to see that (j) is indif-
ferent to all families except the J's and the K's. We are to take it
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that the one member of the J's with which J-l is compatible is J-l.
(Recall that families have mutually exclusive members.) Thus it can be
seen that the value constituent of (j) is (j) itself, that (j) is de-
terminate, and that iv(j)=l, which is intuitively right.
Things quickly go very bad, however. Consider:
(k) J1 or K2.
(l ) Someone 2.
(k) and (1) are indifferent to every family, (k) is compatible with all
the J s, for example, since it can be true when just its second disjunct
is. So (k) and (1) are determinate. The sum of the (vacuous) conjunc-
tion of their value constituents is thus 0--nowhere near their intuitive
intrinsic value.
Oldfield points out these defects and develops a theory that is
not subject to them. He begins with the basics, but he also appeals to
the much broader class of the basic*s :
D4.4 (i) If p is basic, p is basic*;
(ii) if p is basic*, p's negation is basic*;
(iii) if S is a set of basic* propositions and C, the conjunct-
ion of the members of S i s contingent, then C is basic*;
(iv) nothing else is basic*
Oldfield then constructs a notion of "irrelevance," patterned after
Quinn's indifference:
D4.5 p is irrelevant = df. P is contingent and (logically) inde-
pendent of every basic*
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The irrelevant propositions are supposed to be those that are without
evaluative content. 12 "The next task is t0 say what i$ the class Qf
basic propositions in terms of which the intrinsic value of a proposi-
tion should be calculated at a world. "13 Here we have the proposal:
D4 * 6 b is 3 minimal set for p in w ( "Mi n(b,p,w" ) = df (i) b is a
set of basics true in w; and (ii) there is an irrelevant, c,
such that (a) c is true in w, and (b) the conjunction of c and
the members of b entails p; and (iii) there is no proper sub-
set of b and an irrelevant which is true in w which satisfy
(ii). 14
Let us look at D4.6 in operation. With respect to (k) and (1)
things are simple enough. Consider a world, wl, where K2 and the sky is
blue, and M2 for good measure. What is Mi n ( b , ( k ) ,w) ? Well, [K2] satis-
fies D3(i). The sky being blue can be seen to be an irrelevant. Its
conjunction with K2 entails (k), and no proper subset of [k2] conjoined
to any irrelevant does so. So Min ( [K2] , ( k ) , wl ) . And by parallel rea-
soning, Mi n([K2], ( 1 ) ,wl )
.
Now let us look at another sort of case:
(m) (K2 and the sky is blue) or (J1 and grass is green)
In this case, the true irrelevant for D4 . 6 ( i i ) must be chosen with care.
For no conjunction of basics alone entails (m). In wl we need the sky
being blue for c. But we have it, so (m) seems to go through all right.
The principle of evaluation offered is:
(**) For any world, w, and any proposition, p, true in w, the
intrinsic value of p in w is equal to the sum of the
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intrinsic values of the members of the union of all the minimal
sets for p in wJ6
( ) has its peculiarities. As a world, w2, where J1 and K2,
iv(k)w2 = 3. This is because both [K2] and [Jl] are minimal sets for
(k) in w2, and, following (**), we sum the values of the members of
their union to get iv(k)w2. This result seems at variance with the
powerful intuition that the intrinsic value of a state is a value that
the state guarantees in any world where it occurs--a value it has neces-
sarily. Oldfield may not share this intuition. 16 i n any event, he
offers a principle for "absolute" (i.e., non-world varying) intrinsic
value that can be generalized to:
A IV The absolute intrinsic value of p =
(i) if p has world relative values for both sides of 0, then
0
;
(ii) if not, and p has a world relative value as close to 0
and any that it has, then p has that value;
(iii) otherwise undefined J?
AIV does yield iv(k)=l. Unfortunately, though, it determines
(n) Tom and Tom alone 1
to have 0 intrinsic value. Consider w3 where (n) is true and nine other
people -1. What is (n)'s minimal set in w3? It must be the set con-
taining the basic for each of the ten people in w3, and the (basic) neg-
ative existentials ("NE's") for each other possible person. Only that
set, together with an irrelevant (any irrelevant truth of w3), fits the
requirements on b in D4.6. (Note that nothing implying Tom's uniqueness
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is irrelevant.) Thus it appears that, by (**), iv(n)w3 =
-8. Since (n)
will also have positive values, by AIV we get the unfortunate result:
iv(n) = 0.
Concerning the intrinsic value assignment of -8 to (n) in w3, Old-
field offers an ingenious argument (attributed to Jon RuttenburglS) in
defense of it. It assumes the principle that the world relative intrin-
sic value of necessary equivalents must be the same. Lacking the con-
cept of (varying) world relative intrinsic value, I do not know how to
assess that assumption. Anyway, were the argument sound, it would move
me to either alter AIV in order to salvage the intuitive (absolute) in-
trinsic value for (n) of 1, or revise things earlier on to avoid such
relative values as -8 for any equivalent of (n). Since I think that ac-
ceptable (absolute) intrinsic values can be obtained only when we re-
vise both some preliminary material and AIV, that is what I shall do.
First a preliminary difficulty for (**). Consider:
(o) M10 and Alfred being medium-sized.
There is no minimal set for (o) in any world. That is because (o)'s
second conjunct is _not irrelevant. It is incompatible with the NE for
Alfred. Moreover, there is no set of basics which, together with an ir-
relevant, entails that conjunct. (Initially likely candidates for the
irrelevant typically are implied by some basic*.) So (**) seems to
award (o) the value 0, which is clearly inappropriate.
Since I want to have (o) receive the (absolute) intrinsic value 10
by appeal to "minimal minimal sets," so to speak, I must get the Alfred
basics out of some of the minimals for (o). I think the best way to
proceed is to render the second conjunct of (o) irrelevant by altering
D4.5:
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D4,5a £J. S irrelevant = df. p is contingent, and p is independent
of every basic* which is independent of the conjunction of
every proposition to the effect that a certain possible indi-
vidual exists.
D4.5a makes Alfred being medium- si zed irrelevant. That negative
existential basic* to which it is not D4.5-irrel evant is not logically
independent of the conjunction of exi stenti al s
,
since of course that
conjunction implies it to be false.
What are we to do about things like (n)? I think we should begin
by finding a way to adjust AIV to make (n) worth 1, make
(r) Exactly two people-5 or exactly three people-3
worth -9 (its di sj unct-cl osest-to-0 1 s value), and leave without absolute
value states such as
(s) Someone being happy to some degree or other. 19
Such ratings would appeal to one sensible set of intuitions about the
intrinsic value of complex states.
I think there is a way to build upon Oldfield's work to accomplish
that. Notice that there are worlds where the minimal set for (n) is
just [Tl, the NE for each other possible individual]. Notice further
that Tl is a member of every minimal set for (n). But also notice that
there is no basic which is a member of each minimal set for (r). Even
in the case of (r), however, there will be various 5-apiece pairs and
-3-apiece trios (filled out by NE 1 s for all other individuals) that are
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minimal sets for ( r) and such that no subset of any of these is a mini-
mal set for (r) anywhere. And those are the minimal sets with the right
values in them. All this suggests that we should make use of this con-
cept:
D4.7 is a least minimal set for p = df (i) there is a w such that
s is a minimal set for p in w; and (ii) no proper subset of s
is a minimal set for p in any world.
Though [K-10, Tl, the NE's] is a minimal set for (n) in some
worlds, it is not least minimal set for (n). For the minimal set for
(n) [Tl, the NE's] is a proper subset of it. [J5, L5, the NE's] is a
least minimal set for r, the only minimal sets for (r) other than itself
whose membership it exhausts also contain some other basic. So far so
good.
By appeal to D4.7 we gain the following notion of (absolute)
intrinsic value:
AIV2 The absolute intrinsic value of p =
(i) if there is an n such that n = the sum of the values for a
least minimal set for p which is such that no such sum for
p i s cl ose to 0, then n
;
(ii) otherwise undefined.
AIV2 yields in the case of (r) the (absolute) intrinsic value -9.
To see this, note that least minimal sets for (r) include [J5, K5, the
NE's], [L-3, M-3, N-3, the NE's], and [J-3, M-3, L-3, the NE's]. So no
sum of the values of the members of (r)'s least minimals can be closer
to 0 than -9.
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This accords with a certain conservative intuition about how much
value disjunctions have. But it is simple enough to accommodate the in-
tuition that states like (r) are worthless because there is no value,
positive or negative, that they guarantee. We make further adjustment
in AIV
:
AIV3 The absolute intrinsic value of p =
(i) if there is an n such that n is positive (negative) and
no positive (negative) sum of the values of the conjuncts
of a least minimal set for p is closer to 0, and none is
below (above) 0; then n;
(ii) if, in the case of p, there are two sums of values that
satisfy the positive and negative versions of A I V 3 ( i ) re-
spectively, then 0;
(iii) otherwise undefined.
AIV3 assigns 0 to (r) and its ilk, since having least minimals
that straddle 0 brings AIV3(ii) into play. But it leaves e.g. (s) unde-
fined. The reason concerns a problem with applying the "guaranteed
value" intuition to such cases. It might be that for each world there
is some smallest increment of pleasure which it is pyschol ogical ly pos-
sible for the creatures of that world to experience. But it is not
plausible that there is a necessary minimum. So the hedonistic world-
relative intrinsic values for (s) are as close to 0 as can be, though
never 0. This might inspire attributing 0 intrinsic value to (s), al-
beit with misgivings in light of the fact that (s) guarantees better
than 0 (perhaps with consolation derived from there being nothing better
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than 0 that (s) guarantees). But such an attribution is not even that
satisfactory in the case of:
(t) Two people being pleased to some degree or other.
(t) 's values approach 0 as a limit, too. But there would seem to be
twice as much hedonistic intrinsic good in (t). Such a judgment might
derive from the lack of a full appreciation of the nature of infinite
descending series. But the going gets very tough in the face of:
(u) Someone being pleased to some degree or other and someone else
being twice as pleased.
(u) 's world relative values get just as low as (s)'s, despite its virtu-
ally asserting itself to be better from the hedonistic point of view.
In light of such examples, some will prefer to leave such states without
(absolute) intrinsic values, in the manner of AIV3.
I prefer to assign all those states the absolute intrinsic value
0. I believe that the misgivings in question finally do just rest upon
the manifest scope ambiguity in "guaranteed value," and that the right
reading is "the value the state guarantees," not "the state guarantees
some value." To satisfy my preference here we must have a final formu-
lation of AIV:
AIV4 The absolute intrinsic value of p =
(i) if there is an n such that n is positive (negative) and no
positive (negative) sum of the values of the conjuncts of a
least minimal set for p is closer to 0, and none is below
(above) 0; then n;
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(ii) if, in the case of p, there are two sums of values that satis-
fy the positive and negative versions of AIV4 ( i ) respectively,
then 0;
(iii) if there is an n such that the least minimals for p approach n
as a limit, and no least minimal for p is nearer 0, and none
is on the other side of 0; then n.
C. Hedonism Formulated
If AIV4 determines the value of complex states, which are the hed-
onist's basics? We would like to accomplish two goals with our basics:
First, to make AIV4 work right, conjunctions of basics, in conjunction
with irrelevants, must imply every state having hedonistic value. Sec-
ond, we want the assorted versions of hedoni sm--e.g.
,
those that do, and
those that do not, recognize "quality" differences among pi easures--to
be stated readily within the scheme. The first goal first: As already
mentioned, it may be that for each world there is a physically necessary
least interval of time and intensity of pleasure. Maybe not. But in
any case, it is not credible that there are certain minimal intervals
that hold for all worlds. Thus a difficulty arises when we consider:
(v) Smith experiencing pleasure of 2 units intensity.
(v) is short for one of the following:
(v‘) Smith experiencing pleasure of two units of intensity now or
then
,
for some contextually definite time),
(v 1 ') Smith experiencing pleasure of two units intensity for some
interval of time or other.
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Since pleasure must take time, (v‘ ) and (v") are in the same boat with
some intensity or other" states--either intrinsically worthless or con-
founding to the guiding intuition of guaranteed value.
By the same token, from the vantage point of "qualitative" hedon-
i sm, states such as
(w) Smith experiencing pleasure of 2 units intensity for 2 seconds
also guarantee vanishingly little intrinsic goodness (except in the dub-
ious circumstance that there is some least unit of "quality"). And we
should not assume that hedonists can consistently recognize only inten-
sity, duration, and "quality" as independent, evaluatively relevant,
variable properties of pleasures. One way in which criticisms to the
effect that hedonism values too much can be blunted is to factor in an
admirability rating for pleasures. It can be said with prima facie con-
sistency that e.g. detached, intellectual enjoyment of sadistic acts and
of magnanimous deeds, of equal quantity and quality, differ so much in
admirability that the former is intrinsically inferior to the latter.
Perhaps still other parameters must be admitted; perhaps intensity and
duration tell the whole story. How can we be sure that, in any case our
basics will fit properly into the rest of the theory?
Well, if I had some version of hedonism to advocate, it would be
sufficient to identify its basics. But an adequate defense of a parti-
cular version of hedonism is the topic of some other dissertation.
Here, I am restricted to attempting to say which are the basics relative
to any given version of hedonism.
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Recall that in section A we left off our try at isolating the
"pleasure-states" with the problem of the core essence (an individual
essence of x which is thought of whenever anyone thinks of any individ-
ual essence of x, speaking roughly). I am now prepared to hold that
core essences are worse than doubtful
--they are lacking entirely. For
we must acknowledge such individual essences of A. N. Whitehead as being
Russell's co-author of Principia Mathematica in @ (where names this
world), and being the author of Process and Reality in @. And there is
nothing peculiar to Whitehead that must be thought of when thinking of
each. So Whitehead has no core essence.
Because of this consideration, I think that we must abandon the
D4.1-D4.3 approach. In fact, the only way I see to turn brings us back
into the region of the metaphysically dubious. I think we have to look
to what Herbert Heidelberger calls "singular propositions." The doc-
trine of singular propositions is the view that, for every property (re-
lation) and object(s), there is a proposition--a singular one--which is
believed just in case the proerty (relation) is attributed de re to the
objects in a given order. If there are such propositions, some of them
fill the bill as pleasure-states. But which ones?
As we have seen, each basic for a version of hedonism has to spell
out how the pleasure rates with respect to each factor that the version
deems a contributor to intrinsic value. Otherwise the state does not
imply the presence of any positive quantity of intrinsic value, by the
standard of the version in question. Which factors can versions of
hedonism appeal to? Since each is to give us quantities of intrinsic
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value that pleasures introduce, each must identify magnitudes that per-
tain in some way to pleasure, and tell us what function of those magni-
tudes yields the intrinsic value of the pleasure. For example, classi-
cal quantitative" hedonism as I understand it is the view that the in-
trinsic value of an instance of someone taking pleasure in something is
the product of the intensity and the duration of the pleasure.
This example lands us in the middle of several controversi es.
They might repay detailed discussion, but it does not belong here. Yet
if only one variety of hedonism is coherent, much of this discussion has
been superfluous. I think that is not the situation; I shall try to say
just enough here about the controversies to make that opinion credible.
The "intensity" of a pleasure might be taken to refer to the felt
vigor of the sensation or other mental event that gives rise to it. But
I think a version of hedonism that assigns a signficant independent con-
tribution to intrinsic value by that variable is beyond belief. It
overrates the fairly modest joys of jackhammeri ng and underrates the
considerable pleasure that can be got from the feeling of a soft warm
breeze. Preferable is the view of C. D. Broad according to whom there
is a simple, directly apprehended magnitude--hedonic tone--present in
some degree whenever pleasure is taken. 20 when the pleasure is sens-
ory, we speak of this as "how good it feels (tastes, smells, etc.)";
when the pleasure is not primarily sensory, we speak of "how much we
like it." This quality seems the most reasonable referent for the "in-
tensity" of the pleasure.
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Some have doubted that there can be a way to measure this inten-
sity. It seems that there might be, since we might establish a corre-
lation of its degree with the strength of electrical current in some
part of the brain or the like. But I see no reason to believe that the
truth or coherence of an appeal to this intensity turns on its being
measurabl e.
Mill appears to have thought that the value of a pleasure also de-
pends upon an independent variable that he called "quality." Three
questions: Is that thought consistent with the position that only "more
pleasure" supplies more positive intrinsic value?21 What feature of a
pleasure is its "quality"? And is it still hedonism when differences of
"quality" are brought in? It seems to me that the first question should
concern us only if a certain sort of answer to the third is correct.
For unless a view is a version of hedonism only if it affirms the bi-
conditional in the first question, it does not matter to us what the
answer to that question is. Similarly, only after we determine what
would count as a hedonistic theory can we see what can be consistently
taken as an intrinsic value determining "quality" difference.
What makes a value theory hedonistic? The following requirement
is uncontroversi al : All positive value is to be contributed by pleas-
ure. That is too vague to get us far. What facts about a pleasure can
be used? Intuitively speaking, the intensity of the pleasure is okay;
the extent to which the society in which it is felt is just, is not
okay. What is the difference? My hypothesis is that the only magni-
tudes that a distinctively hedonistic theory of intrinsic goodness can
make relevant are experienced variables in pleasurable experiences.
Somewhat more precisely:
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D4 * 8 M is potentially hedoni stical ly significant = df. There is a
set, S, of properties, each of which is necessarily such that
it is exemplified iff someone exemplifies it, is aware of it,
and is pleased; and for some number, n, and duration, d, the
degree of M is n iff someone exemplifies, and is aware of,
each quality in S during d, and some quality or other in S
throughout d.
I think that D4.8 sorts magnitudes appropriately. For example, in
the case of intensity, S is the set containing just the quality which is
some given degree of hedonic tone and i is a single moment. For dura-
tion, the quality is that of taking pleasure in something, and the de-
gree, M, equals the duration of i. The property of being pleased in a
society having degree of justice M fails D4.8, since degree of justice
does not correlate with any experiential quality; society can be that
just while no one is aware of it. The property of being pleased while
having existed for M seconds also does not pass D4.8. No experiential
qualities which are present just when a person is pleased are exempli-
fied only when that person is a given age. I like those inclusions and
exclusions, but I do not claim that D4.8 is the only reasonable proposal
for potentially hedoni stical ly relevant magnitudes.
If D4.8 is an acceptable account, what might be a magnitude that
determines a pleasure's "quality"? Some passages in Util i tar i an ism2
8
suggest that differences in objects of pi easure--what the pleasure is
taken i n--determi ne "quality" differences. "Intellectual" objects are
esteemed better than "bodily" ones. It is not obvious what magnitude
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is intended. A varying intellectual factor that D4.8 allows a hedonist
to count relevant is the degree of concentration on the object of
pleasure. How intently we are attending to what we are taking pleasure
in is, I think, something we experience. And it could be taken to
measure the degree of our intellectual involvement, and thus the intel-
lectual "quality" of the pleasure. It is, at any rate, a magnitude in
addition to intensity and duration that D4.8 allows a hedonist to take
into account. 23 And finally, concerning our first "quality" question,
if we say that intensity and duration together determine "how much"
pleasure is had, then a hedonist can with consistency appeal to such
things as degree of concentration in denying that the better a pleasure
is, the more of it there must be.
As I see it, then, a full-blown version of hedonism must select
its magnitudes from the properties that satisfy D4.8. And it must
choose its basics from these singular propositions:
D4.9 B is a potential basic bearer of hedonic intrinsic goodness =
df. B is a singular proposition such that necessarily, S be-
lieves B iff there are degrees and potentially hedoni stical ly
significant magnitudes such that S attributes to someone the
property of entering into the pleasure taking relation to
those degrees of those magnitudes.
The magnitudes that are relevant for a version of hedonism are the ones
it deems independently to affect the intrinsic value of any potential
basic, i.e.:
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^*10 Ml-Mn a re the relevant magnitudes for version of hedonism V =
df (i) Ml-Mn are potentially hedoni st ical ly significant; and
(i) according to V, for any potential basic hedonistic bearers
x and y, necessarily, if x is intrinsically better than y,
then at least one of Ml-Mn has a greater value for x than for
y; and (iii) according to V, for each of Ml-Mn, there are po-
tential basic hedonistic bearers x and y such that x is in-
trinsically better than y, and x equals y for every other mag-
nitude from Ml-Mn.
Now we can identify the basics for a version of hedonism:
D4 .11 B is a basic bearer of intrinsic goodness for version of
hedonism V = df. B is a potential basic bearer of hedonic
value that attributes values to exactly the relevant
magnitudes for V.
Finally, a full version of hedonism must say which function of its
relevant magnitudes gives the intrinsic values of its basics:
D4.12 F is the intrinsic value function for version of hedonism V =
df. According to V, the function, F(x, Ml,...Mn, y), is such
that if x is a basic for V attributing pleasure to someone to
degrees Ml-Mn of the magnitudes deemed hedoni stical ly relevant
by V, then y is the intrinsic value of x.
AIV4 will operate on the basics of a version and the values as-
signed by its basic intrinsic value function in yielding the intrinsic
values of the complex states of affairs. But it is not quite that sim-
ple to have a complete theory. We also have to be told which are the
intri nsical ly bad basics. Until now I have said nothing about pain
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here. Traditionally, the doctrine that pleasure is the only intrinsic
good has been paired with the view that pain is the only intrinsic evil.
Yet it is obvious that the former does not logically imply or analytic-
ally contain the latter (nor vice versa). Thus it is intriguing to
speculate about the justification for this pairing.24 intrinsic good-
ness is our subject, however. So here I confine myself to noting that
utilization of the modified Qui nn-01 df i el d machinery for assigning value
to complex states awaits an account of the basics bearing intrinsic di s-
val ue.25
D. Brentano's Argument Against Hedonism
As I say, a thorough assessment of the many reasonable versions of
hedonism is a thesis-size undertaking by itself. Three arguments af-
fecting the truth of any hedonism will be considered below. The first,
by Brentano, is aimed at showing that if pleasure is intri nsical ly good,
then so is something else. I take it up becuase I believe it is inter-
esting and deserves to be laid out more fully than it is in Brentano's
formulation. The second argument we will consider is C. D. Broad's ob-
jection to the effect that the evil of malice shows that all forms of
hedonism count too much as intrinsically good. And the third case is
Moore's example intended to show that hedonism, by leaving out beauty,
counts too little as intrinsically good. An accounting of the replies
available to the hedonist against the latter two objections goes a long
way toward exhibiting hedonism's strengths.
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Brentano's objection is modestly complicated. It is stated in a
compressed fashion, which must be quoted in full:
To feel pleasure or delight is an emotional act, a taking pleasure
or a loving; it always has an object, is necessarily a pleasure in
something which we perceive or imagine, have an idea of. For ex-
ample, sensual pleasure has a certain localized sense quality as its
object. Now if nothing other than pleasure could be loved, this
would mean that every act of loving had an act of loving as an ob-
ject, but the beloved act of loving would have in turn to be di-
rected upon an act of loving, and so forth ad infinitum
. No; in
order for pleasure to exist at all something other than pleasure
must be capable of being loved.
But it follows further that pleasure is not the only thing
worthy of love. If it were, any pleasure would be pleasure taken in
something unworthy of love and hence unworthy of being an object of
pleasure. And in that case, pleasure could scarcely be worthy of
love; the danger would be that nothing at all was worthy of love.
If pleasure is a good, there must also be other goods.
^
The best way I see to proceed is to set up my reconstruction of
the argument right away, then discuss that. It will, I believe, be
clear enough what my textual basis is. It will be helpful to begin with
this abbreviation:
D8 S is the sequence (of propositional objects) for pleasure P =
df. Sis an orderd set which is such that (i) the first mem-
ber, p of S i s a singular proposition consisting in an
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individual taking pleasure in something, and (ii) if a member of S
is a singular proposition consisting in an individual taking pleas-
ure in something, then its successor is that in which that member
states the individual to be taking pleasure.
Brentano's argument .
(1) For each pleasure, there is exactly one object in which that pleas-
ure is taken.
(2) No pleasure can have a sequence having no last member (i.e., "ad
infinitum ").
(3) Each pleasure has a finitely long sequence. (1, 2)
(4) (x) if x is worthy of love, then pleasure taken in x is unworthy of
1 ove.
Suppose (5) Only pleasures are worthy of love.
(6) Each pleasure is either pleasure taken in a pleasure, or pleasure
in something unworthy of love. (1, 4, 5) 27
(7) (x) if x is worthy of love, then x is a pleasure taken in a pleas-
ure. (4, 5, 6)
(8) (x) if x is a pleasure, then the next to last member of th sequence
for x is unworthy of love. (3, 4, 7)
(9) (x) if x is a pleasure, then each member of the sequence for x (in-
cluding x itself) is unworthy of love, (repeated applications of 3,
4 and 7
)
(10)
If only pleasures are worthy of love, then nothing is worthy of
love. (7, 9, and CP 5-9)
[conclusion over]
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(11) If pleasures are worthy of love, then so is something that is not a
pleasure. (10)
The first inference is in need of comment. Notice first that it
follows from (1) alone that there is a sequence for each pleasure. (2)
says that pleasures having sequences all have finite ones. So (3) fol-
1 ows.
I believe that--(l ) (2) , hence ( 3 )— i s a sound argument. (1) is
not immediately obvious to all. But apparent counter examples lose all
force upon inspection. Certain sensory qualities happen to be spontane-
ously and powerfully pleasing. This creates some temptation to say that
they themselves are pleasures, rather than items that are pleasurably
taken. That is, it can seem that some gratifications are just cases of
having a one place sensory quality, not relations of subjects to states,
but I think that careful phenomenological scrutiny reveals that there
are no "pure pleasure qualities." Instead, there are pleasing feelings.
With some effort or imagination it is possible to think of having those
very feelings while not taking pleasure in them. (For example, suppose
they were known to be sure signs of one's imminent, ghastly demise.) So
they need not be liked. We say they are "pleasures" because we like our
having them, i.e., the feeling is the object of the pleasure-taking re-
lation.
Perhaps (2) is debatable. I suppose that someone with divine cog-
nitive powers could take pleasures having infinite sequences, but it
seems best just to leave that consideration aside. (We could scrupu-
lously add the antecedent "If nothing has divine powers, then" to
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(2) and the conclusion.) The best way I see to justify (2) is to point
out that a pleasure violating it would be not merely "infinitely in-
volved," but also "infinitely i nvol uted" : 28
04,13 £j.s infinitely involved = df. Necessarily, whoever thinks of
P thinks of infinitely many states of affairs.
° 4 * 14 £ is infinitely involuted = df. Each state of affairs in-
volved in p is infinitely involved.
It seems to me that infinitely involuted states are necessarily mind-
boggling. So I accept (2), and endorse the argument from (1) and (2) to
(3)
.
Premise (4) is taken straight from the text (from the second cited
paragraph). It is where the argument breaks down. With effort, we can
read (4) to say merely:
(4a) (x) if taking pleasure in x (i.e., "love" of x) is not of the
worthy sort, then pleasure taken in x is not worthy (i.e.,
"unworthy of love").
But of course hedonists can blithely and consistently accept the nearly
empty (4a). (4a), (1), and (5) do not imply (6), nor is there another
valid way to gain (11) from ( 1 ) - (4a ) . So (4a) is an inappropriate
readi ng.
On the other hand, it is not difficult to give (4) a sufficiently
powerful construal to gain validly an anti-hedonistic conclusion.
First, though, we should be clear about what sort of conclusion we have.
Even a hedonist accepting Brentano's views about the relation of good-
ness of various sorts to being worthy of love need not dispute (11).
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After all, Brentano only claims that being worthy of love is being
good in the "broadest" sense. 29 Hedonists can agree that things
other than pleasures are "broadly" speaking "good," whether that means
overall good or the disjunction of intrinsic and extrinsic goodness.
The most efficient way to turn this argument into one addressed
straightforwardly against hedonism is to suppose that Brentano meant to
appeal to a special sort of "love" (call it "i-love") which is suited to
exactly the intrinsic goods, i.e., they are worthy of it, and only they
are. 30 Then we can suppose him to have been intending i-love through-
out. Now to gain (6) we can turn to:
(4b) (x) if x is not worthy of i-love, then pleasure taken in x is
not worthy of i-love.
And now (11) implies the distinctly anti-hedonistic:
(12) If a pleasure is intrinsically good, then so is some non-
pi easure.
The implication of (12) by (1), (2) and (4b) is interesting. Let
us pause and give it due reflection . . .
The trouble is that it is very hard to see why a hedonist, or any-
one else, should accept (4b). (4b) is quite a severe doctrine. It im-
plies that all pleasure in the intri nsical ly neutural--even when it is
known to be overall good--lacks intrinsic goodness. Yet a pleasure
taken in the discovery of a wonder drug seems as good as any. (4b) is
not plausible on its own, and Brentano does not defend it.
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Does (4) have a more credible reading which also has sufficient
logical power for the argument at hand? Here is a fairly plausible
claim, not as trivial as (4a):
(4c) (x) if x is intrinsically bad, then pleasure taken in x is
not worthy of i-love.
Brentano has asserted that his epistemic test for intrinsic value
vouches for (4c). 31 of course the hedonist should insist upon seeing
both that claim and the criterion verified, since the denial of hedonism
is implied by (4c) together with the uncontroversi al :
(13) Some pleasures have been taken in intrinsic evils.
It clearly follows that not all pleasures are intrinsically good. But
what is most important in the present context is that (4c) does not sup-
port a valid inference to (11) via (1) and (2). This can be readily
verified by noting that (1) and (2) only give us that some pleasure has
an object which is not a pleasure, and thus, when (5) holds, not intrin-
sically good. That does not imply what is needed to make use of (4c)--
that each pleasure has an intrinsic evil as an object when (5) holds.
So even the rather dubious (4c) is too weak for the argument.
Other readings of (4) can be tried. None I have thought of accom-
plishes Brentano's purposes.
We can summarize the results of this section in this way:
Brentano can show that if pleasure is intrinsically good only when its
object is intrinsically good, then pleasures are not the only intrinsic
goods. But the antecedent to that that statement needs defense and
seems indefensible.
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E» Broad's Malice Objection
C. D. Broad's objection to hedonism is simple and direct. He asks
us to give careful consideration to a certain sort of pleasure. He
thinks that reflection makes it obvious that this sort of pleasure is
bad, not good:
Now consider the state of mind which is called 'malice.' Suppose I
perceive or think of the undeserved misfortune of another with
pleasure. Is it not perfectly plain that any cognition which has
the relational property of being cognition of another's undeserved
misfortune and the hedonic quality of pleasantness will be worse as
the pleasure is more intense? No doubt malice is a state of mind
which on the whole tends to increase human misery. But surely it is
clear that we do not regard it as evil merely as a means. Even if
we were quite sure all malice would be impotent, it seems clear to
me we should condemn it as intrinsically bad. 32
The only way I know of utterly to quash and refute an objection is
to deduce a contradiction from it using only the safest inference rules.
That cannot be done in this case. In fact, I think that not even
"garden-variety" refutation is possible here. (I mean plain old refu-
tation. I suppose "garden-variety" was once roughly co-extensive with
"average quality" among flowers or vegetables. It is so much better now
as to make the metaphor misleading.) Indeed, Broad's is an appeal to
what is intuitively so. That would seem to put it beyond all reasoned
critici sm--there is no disputing about taste, as they say (usually in
Latin). I suppose not. But there are things that can be said against
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objections which are said to derive from immediate intuition. Sometimes
what is purported to be intuitive is actually a badly drawn inference.
Perhaps the claim that it is intuitive that one is not moving when
standing still on solid ground is a good example of this. How are such
claims to be combatted with rational force? The best that can be done,
I think, is to point to an intuitive truth which is being confused with
the asserted intuition, and show that the assertion is not justified by
that truth. (In the motion example, it can be observed that what one
knows is that one is not moving relative to what is standardly presup-
posed as the velocity-determining frame of refernce--the surface of the
earth. That of course leaves open the question of motion in relation to
other things.) So our question here ought to be: Can the hedonist do
that much in the case of the apparent evil of malice?
It is a start to suggest that we focus only upon the value we find
in malice when it has no valuable consequences for good or ill. That
will help us attend to its intrinsic value. But clearly Broad is aware
of the importance of ignoring consequences, and yet he means to draw our
attention to an intuition of negative value stemming from thought about
the malicious frame of mind itself. And the hedonist should, I believe,
grant that there is such an intuition.
But states which may be the ones Broad is counting as cases of
malice are ones in which the hedonist can consistently find some evil.
Broad speaks of pleasurable "cognition of another's undeserved misfor-
tune." Perhaps, then, he means such states as:
(x) Robinson taking pleasure in what he knows to be Smith's un
deserved misfortune.
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Hedonists are not even committed to (x) being intrinsically good, (x)
implies some pleasure for Robinson, which they must count good. But it
also implies misfortune, which hedonists are logically free to count
intrinsically evil. At least intensities and durations must also be
specified, before the hedonist is committed to an intrinsic value status
for (x).
But more importantly, states such as (x), even where all param-
eters relevant for the version of hedonism are specified, as in:
(x 1 ) Robinson taking pleasure for 2 seconds of 2 units intensity in
what he knwos to be Smith undergoing 2 seconds of 1 unit in-
tensity pain
must not be just assumed to count as good. Again, the hedonist can with
consistency rate n pain-intensi ty-times-duration units twice as bad as n
pleasure-intensi ty-t imes-duration units is good. 33 $0 only against a
complete intrinsic value theory, of which, say, quantitative hedonism is
the "top half," can the intrinsic value of a state such as (x‘) be
tested
.
We should consider the other major sort of state which mght be
cal led "mal ice"
:
(y) Robinson taking pleasure at what he takes to be Smith's unde-
served misfortune.
Even here, it would be consistent and not crazy for a hedonist to hold
(6) to imply a certain evil di sjunction--Robi nson having a false belief
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or Smith experiencing misfortune. That would not be part of an espe-
cially plausible value theory; it is not worth stressing. Better for
the hedonist to observe that, since it must be malice we consider, a po-
tentially misleading instance of believed evil must be part of the state
considered. If we are inclined to believe that beliefs tend to be true,
as most of us unrefl ect ively are, then intuitions about what the state
gives evidence for may have a pernicious effect on our attempts to as-
sess its intrinsic value.
Another point the hedonist should make also concerns the diffi-
culty in attending to just the state itself, apart from conditions ir-
relevant to its intrinsic value. It is hard, perhaps psychologically
impossible, to try for long to evaluate a state without giving thought
to circumstances that make it true. For (y), these would typically
include much that a hedonist can consistently condemn. Where there is
malice, there is usually some painful episode prompting the attitude.
Also, the individual who feels the malice typically has qualms and mis-
givings about adopting such a feeling. Additionally, despair and des-
peration tend to be among the attitudes formed by the one who feels
malice. Failing to feel well themselves, they attempt consolation by
considering cases that appear to advance their relative status. And
lastly, the malicious are typically also displeased by the other's good
fortune, especially during the immediate temporal vicinity of feeling
malice. Now none of these pains is implied by (y) and its ilk. But to
repeat, there is a very strong tendency to consider (y) against a back-
ground of facts, and these things are part of the normal setting of
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cases of malice. And they do, it seems to me, provide a credible origin
for some of what enters into our negative evaluation of malice. It does
tend to be part of something sordid. Yet none of these things helps to
determine (y)'s intrinsic value. (These accompaniments also help to
explain away Broad's view that malice gets intrinsically worse as the
pleasure gets more intense. For these associated evils do tend to be
worse as the pleasure increases.)
Hedonists can note that malice is evidence for another sort of
negative quality--bad character. Perhaps the existence of a person hav-
ing a bad character, a bad person, is intrinsically bad. Hedonists can
count it so. If they do, (y) is in another way a mixed state--the
pleasure is intrinsically good, but it tends to confirm the presence of
an intrinsic evil. So there is also that way in which we can be misled
when evaluating it.
Hedonists need not explain all evaluations in terms of what they
say is intrinsically good or bad, though. This is obvious in the case
of most good-of-a-ki nd ratings--good cutlery, good thievery, etc. It is
perhaps less clear in the case of good personhood, but I do not see why
even the utilitarian hedonist must equate person evaluations with having
such-and-such a relation to states with such-and-such intrinsic values.
This would be a plausible requirement if being a good person implied
some close connection to performing morally right acts. No such im-
plication seems to withstand scrutiny, however. So I believe that even
the utilitarian hedonist can consistently maintain that there is an
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intuition about badness of character prompted by (y) and the like, while
not founding that upon intrinsic values.
There are two final distinctions which hedonists of every persua-
sion can take note of. It tends to be displeasing to think about cases
of malice. And perhaps displeasure under the right conditions is evi-
dence of intrinsic evil, or at least evidence against intrinsic good-
ness. 34 But the displeasure could be giving evidence for the evil of
some of the above mentioned associated states and persons. After all,
(y) does involve someone suffering undeserved misfortune, even though it
does not imply that. And further, that very displeasure may be the
source of the intuition that the malice is intrinsically bad.
Those seem to me to be the principal points that any hedonist can
make which tend to undermine Broad's objection. Do states like (y) seem
intrinsically bad on intuitive grounds after all these factors have been
properly discounted? I think it quite doubtful that they do. The ob-
jection is not decisive.
F. Moore's Beauty Objection
G. E. Moore tries to persuade us that beauty (a beautiful state of
affairs, we would say) has intrinsic goodness:
Let us imagine one world exceedingly beautiful. Imagine it as beau-
tiful as you can; put into it whatever on this earth you most
admire--mountai ns
,
rivers, the sea; trees and sunsets, stars and
moon. Imagine all these combined in exquisite proportions, so that
no one jars against the other, but each contributes to increase the
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beauty of the whole. And then imagine the ugliest world you can
possibly conceive. Imagine it simply one heap of filth, containing
whatever is more disgusting to us for whatever reason, and the whole
as far as it may be without one redeeming feature. ... The one
thing we are not entitled to imagine is that any human being ever
has, or ever by any possibility can . . . see and enjoy the beauty
of the one or hate the foulness of the other. Well, even so suppos-
ing them quite apart from any possible contemplation by any human
being; still, is it irrational to hold that it is better that the
beautiful world should exist than the one which is ugly?35
These remarks were in fact directed against Sidgwick's view of
what it would be rational to aim to produce. But it is clear that the
beautiful world is to be intri nsical ly better. Also, the comparison be-
tween a beautiful and an aesthetically (and otherwise) neutral world is
better for our interests, since hedonists can attribute disvalue of var-
ious sorts to ugliness.
Again, I think the most that can be done in rational opposition to
the case is to point out potentially misleading facets of the example.
The main thing to draw attention to is an effect of that fact that we
are actually contemplating the appearances of the pretty and neutral
worlds when we assess them. It is more pleasing to think of the former
than the latter. The power of this to distract us from the intrinsic
evaluation of them can be easily underestimated.
An analogy might help. Think of the occasion on which you were
told the most amusing anecdote that you have heard lately. Now imagine
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a world in which loosely speaking nothing exists except a perfect simu-
lation of the visual and auditory features of the story-teller by an un-
likely sequence of aggregations of randomly fluctuating atoras-no con-
scious life is in that world. Compare it to a world that is so to speak
a complete blank-an empty void. It is quite difficult not to like the
former better, and this makes it remarkably tempting to say that it is a
better place. But here, sober further reflection enables us to decline
to reach the conclusion that the exemplification of the perceptual qual-
ities of humorous anecdote recitation is good in itself. We realize
that we are amused to think of the place, and that it contains an occur-
rence that powerful tends to provoke enjoyment, but that exhausts its
value.
I believe that the same realization is available in the case of
the beautiful and neutral worlds. At least it seems that at this point
the champion of Moore's objection should say more if it is to persuade
us. I do not know what Moore would do, nor do I know what more would
do.
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APPENDIX
INSTRUMENTAL VALUE WITHOUT INTRINSIC VALUE?
There has been a surprising controvery among axiologists. The
disputed question is whether something might be instrumental ly valuable
while nothing is i ntri nsical ly valuable. It is surprising that there
has been controversy about this because it would seem to amount to the
question whether a thing could possess worth solely as a means to a
worthless end. It seems obvious that the answer to that question is no.
Yet Paul Taylor J Monroe Beardsley
,
2 and Gilbert Harman 3 have
denied that instrumental goodness implies intrinsic goodness. Charles
Baylis^ has affirmed the implication. I believe that there is no
conflict of basic intuitions here. The purpose of this appendix is to
resolve the issue. Various concepts of instrumental value must be
distinguished. When we bring each into sharp focus, we gain a clear
answer to the question whether it implies intrinsic goodness. In the
case of all but one of the concepts of interest, the implication fails.
For the one exception, an argument resembling the first cause argument
for God's existence establishes the implication.
A. The Argument From Definition
Monroe Beardsley discusses an argument from definition for the
conclusion that instrumental value implies intrinsic value. Here is the
definition at stake
:
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D5.1 "x has instrumental! value" means "x is conducive to some-
thing that has intrinsic value,"
where "conducive" is meant to cover the relations of being a necessary
part and being a means. 5 Beardsley comments:
Obviously, if we accept [D5.1] we are as committed to the existence
of intrinsic value as we are to the existence of instrumental
val ue.6
We can take this to be a way to affirm the relevant implication:
P5.1 Necessarily, if something has instrumental! value, then
something i ntri nsical ly good occurs. 7
Clearly, D5.1 guarantees the truth of P5.1. So clear is this, in
fact, that to the best of my knowledge D5.1 has never been disputed by
any philosopher. If D5.1 gave the concept of instrumental value at is-
sue, there would be no issue. D5.1 has been thought to define a signif-
icant concept of instrumental value. G. E. Moore proposed it as an an-
alysis of "good as a means. "8 I think it can be shown that that is
not correct. D5.1 misses the concept with which Moore was concerned
there, and that concept does raise a non-trivial question about whether
there is an implication from instrumental to intrinsic value. To see
that the analysis fails, notice that something might have intrinsic
value and extrinsic disvalue in such proportion as to be neutral in to-
tal value. If an event is conducive to something like that and to noth-
ing else of any sort of value, then it satisfies Dl. But there is no
familiar or helpful sense in which it is then "good as a means," or "of
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instrumental value." So P5.1 uses a technical concept of no clear in-
terest. Its proof by definition does not advance the issue.
In effect, Beardsley too denies the significance of P5.1. He ob-
serves that in the case of instrumental value
... it does not matter whether the value [of the thing that con-
fers value upon its instrument] is intrinsic or instrumental. 9
He maintains that the following definition "should be acceptable":
D5.2 "x has instrumental value" means "x is conducive to some-
thing that has value."
Charles Baylis has proposed the result of replacing "that has value" in
which D5.2 with good as his explanation of being i nstrumental ly
good. 10 Neither philosopher specifies what sort of "value" or "good-
ness" is meant. (We might find in the comments by Beardsley that were
just cited the suggestion that he intended the concept of having either
intrinsic or instrumental value. But that would render D5.2 circular.
And the consideration just raised against D5.1 would show that D5.2 also
gave a concept weaker than any intuitive notion of instrumental value.)
Our complaint against D5.1 suggests that the right concept to use is
what we call being "good on the whole" or "overall good." Roughly
speaking, that is the concept of making ethically significant contribu-
tions that are positive on balance. In the case of that notion, plainly
it "does not matter" whether the impact is positive because of intrinsic
or instrumental factors. Also, I believe that it is what is usually in-
tended when something is called "good" or "valuable," where that is not
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short for a good such-and-such." So we construe Beardsley and Baylis
to be proposing:
05.3 "x has instrumental 3 value" means "x is conducive to some-
thing overall good."
D5.3 captures what it is to be of some good as a means. And it allows
the formulation of the non-trivial:
P5.3 Necessarily, if something has instrumental value, then
something intrinsically good occurs.
The argument from definition in this case clearly fails. P5.3
cannot be derived from D5.3 by logic alone. But is it true?
B. Beardsley, Taylor, and Harman on
First Cause Arguments
P5.3 has been taken to be susceptible to another sort of proof.
The overall goodness of a thing is entirely composed of the goodness it
has on its own and the goodness it gains from contingent relations to
other things. That makes something like the first cause argument look
attractive. It is tempting to think that something could have instru-
mental 3 value only if somewhere along the line of things to which it
bears a causal or part-to-whole connection is something that is overall
good by virtue of having value on its own, i.e., intrinsic goodness.
Here is Beardsley's sketch of such an argument:
1
Instrumental ly valuable' is a relational concept--x borrows its
value from y or y confers its value upon x. If the value y confers
is itself instrumental, so that it is merely passed along from z.
107
where does z gets its value? In the last analysis, something must
possess value in itself, or nothing can get any value. 11
This seems to be the reasoning that Baylis relies on when he as-
serts that instrumental value does require intrinsic value. 12
Beardsley's objection to this version of the argument is somewhat ob-
scure. He says that it cannot be a "pure formal demonstration," since in
view of the failure of the argument from definition it is not self-
contradictory to assert the existence of instrumental value and deny the
existence of intrinsic value. 13 it is not clear what the problem is
supposed to be. Apparently, a difficulty is to be brought about by the
fact that definition alone does not suffice to prove P5.3. But even in
the argument's present rather metaphorical rendering, there is no sug-
gestion that definition does all the work. Nearly enough, it proceeds
by moving from the claim that gaining value i nstrumental ly has the same
logical structure as borrowing to the conclusion that such gain requires
"owned" value, i.e., intrinsic goodness. These may be a priori obvious
truths even if they do not follow directly from definitions. That seems
to be the status of the proposition that red is a color, for example.
So there does not seem to be a decisive objection here. We shall return
to this argument below, 14 when we are better equipped to evaluate it.
Beardsley offers a revised version, aimed at avoiding his objec-
tion:
Premise 1 We know, or have good reason to believe, that some things
are instrumental ly valuable.
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Premise 2 We could not know this unless we knew some things to be
intrinsically valuable.
[Thus,] We know some things to be intrinsically valuable. 15
Since knowledge of instrumental value may depend upon knowledge of in-
trinsic value even if there is no existential dependence, this argument
offers no direct support for P5.3. But we should consider Beardsley's
objection to it, for it serves to bring to our attention an important
kind of instrumental value. He objects to Premise 2 by offering what he
takes to be a case of knowledge of instrumental value without knowledge
of intrinsic value. The example is that of good health. It is claimed
that we see it to "retain its eligibility" as an instrumental good by
witnessing a variety of si tuations--seei ng that where present it did not
"interfere with our pursuits," and where absent it "contributed to the
rise of difficult problems and limited our capacity to solve them. "I 6
We should agree that these things can be learned without evidence
for the presence of any intrinsic good. But recall that the sense of
instrumental value" at stake is given by D5.3 (our reading of
Beardsley's wording in D5.2). The mentioned features of good health do
not give knowledge that it is conducive to an overall good. Knowing
that requires evidence that freedom to pursue our pursuits or freedom
from difficult problems is, or conduces to, an overall good. We need to
be shown that those freedoms could be seen to be of positive overall
worth without evidence about intrinsic goods. And that is not done. So
Beardsley does not give a clear case of knowledge of i nstrumental 3
value in the absence of knowledge of intrinsic value here.
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There is a familiar notion of instrumental value that is readily
seen to be exemplified by good health because of the features indicated
in the example. We can bring out that notion in a rough way with:
D 5.4 "x has instrumental value" means "events consisting in
instantiations of x sufficiently often make causal contribu-
tions to gaining something that is sought."^ 7
This is the concept of being a generally effective means to some end,
whether or not the end has any sort of value. Certainly we are often
concerned with just this kind of instrumental value. It is clear that
Beardsley s objection to Premise 2 would be successful if this concept
were the one at stake. For it applies to good health because of just
the sort of feature noted-utility in the long run. And plainly we can
be justified in believing good health to have instrumental 4 value
while we have no evidence about intrinsic goods. So perhaps this was
what Beardsley was thinking of when he proposed the objection, rather
than instrumental value.
We should also note that properties can have instrumental
4
value while no intrinsic good obtains. For example, there are the
gloomy possible situations where events which consist in instantiating
the property of consulting an authority on painless suicide usually gain
people something they seek in conditions entirely unrelieved by intrin-
sic goods. So it is plain that we have no instrumental to intrinsic
value implication in the case of this concept.
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P5.3 is not refuted by such examples, however. We have yet to see
anything that undermines the intuition that instrumental value must
ultimately derive from intrinsic value.
Paul Taylor and Gilbert Harman have also attacked first cause ar-
guments for the sort of implication in question. A careful examination
of their work brings out new concepts of instrumental value. Taylor
writes
:
[T]here is nothing inconsistent in supposing ... a world where all
values [are] extrinsic, the value of one thing depending upon the
value of another whose value in turn depends on the value of some-
thing else, ad infinitum . . .18
The sort of extrinsic" value which Taylor calls "instrumental goodness"
is given this characterization:
. . . creation, furtherance, strengthening, or increase of something
intrinsically or extri nsical ly good, or destruction, hinderance,
avoidance, weakening or decrease of something intrinsically dis-
val uable J9
The same considerations that showed fault in D5.1 show that this
account is too weak to identify any familiar concept. An event might
"further" an intrinsic good which is extri nsical ly so bad as to be neu-
tral in overall value. There is no intuitive sense in which doing that
is sufficient for having "i nstrumental value." Again, we do better by
appealing to overall value. Simplifying while retaining what is cru-
cial, we get:
Ill
D5.5 "x has 1 instrumental
5 value" means "x causally contributes to
bringing about something overall good or preventing something
overall bad."
D5.5 does seem to give us a concept of interest. It is clear that we
sometimes take things to have instrumental merit because of what they
prevent as well as what they accomplish. The implication in question,
then, is:
P5.5 Necessarily, if something has i nstrumental 5 value, then
something intrinsically good occurs.
Taylor tries to describe a world that shows P5.5 to be false:
In such a world, things would be judged as good solely as means to
ends which were to be good solely as parts of wholes which were to
be judged to be good solely as means to ends and so on indefinitely,
... No one would do anything for its own sake, simply because he
found personal enjoyment in it. It would be a world of 'practical
people' who know how to get things done but had no reason for get-
ting one thing done rather than another.20
Since Taylor holds that only "personal enjoyments" can be intrinsically
good, 21 there would be nothing in these worlds that he counts as in-
trinsically good (assuming that there are no personal enjoyments, and
not merely that no one does anything for the sake of them). But why
should we say that these worlds include instrumental 5 goods? It must
be because the things judged good are only judged good as means and
parts. Yet of course that fact alone should not persuade us. We need
to see that occurrences in such worlds actually further goods or hinder
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evils, not merely that they are judged to do so. Taylor does not indi-
cate how we might see this.
We need not follow Taylor by objecting to P5.5 on the ground that
an endless sequence of instrumental goods is possible. For an event can
get instrumental value by just keeping something overall bad from
coming to pass. For example, an inoculation that prevents the acquisi-
tion of a dreadful disease presumably has i nstrumental 5 value. This
might occur in the unfortunate absence of any intrinsic good. So D5.5
provides us with another reading of "instrumental value" in which it is
simple to see that this predicate might apply where nothing is intrin-
sically good. But we should not forget that we are still without any
disproof of P5.3.
Like Taylor and Beardsley, Gilbert Harman denies the inconsisten-
cy of ... the notion of an infinite series A, B, C, etc. each member
of which is desirable only because the next one is. "22 Harman tries
to locate the plausibility and the defect in first cause arguments
against such series, and he gives us yet another sense of " instrumental
val ue."
The crucial notion in his reconstruction of the argument is that
of basic instrinsic value. A "basic intrinsic value function" as Harman
defines it is any such that the intrinsic value of a thing is the sum of
all the results of applying the function to each entailment of the
thing; and such that the total value of a thing, x, is the sum of all
the results of applying the function to each thing, y, times the degree
to which y is probable on x.23 Here is the first cause argument
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Hannan constructs: 24 If there is a basic intrinsic value function,
then nothing has psitive overall value unless the result of applying the
function something--the "basic intrinsic value" of the t h i ng -
- i s a posi-
tive number. That is clearly true since unless the function yields a
positive number somewhere, each overall value will be the sum of the re-
sults of multiplying various degrees of probability times the basic in-
trinsic value zero. So, if there is a basic intrinsic value function,
then:
P5.h Necesarily, if something is overall good, then something has
positive basic intrinsic value.
Harman's objection to his first cause argument consists in ques-
tioning whether there is a basic intrinsic value function. 25 But
without finding out whether there does exist such a function, we can as-
certain that this argument does not prove the sort of implication in
question here. Notice that P5.h states an implication from overall
value to basi
c
intrinsic goodness. There is an important link with
P5.3, since if something has i nstrumental 3 value, then by definition
something is overall good. But if there j_s a basic intrinsic value
function, then it is clearly possible for there to be something with in-
strumental value while no intrinsic good simpliciter obtains. For if
there is a basic intrinsic value function, the overal 1 value of, for ex-
ample, administering a medicine will be positive if it increases the
probability of some intrinsic good such as the patient experiencing the
joy of recovery. This positive value does not depend upon the joy actu-
ally being felt. The existence of a basic intrinsic value function
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requires the possibility of overall goods occurring where nothing in-
trinsically good happens. In those situations, events conducing to such
overall goods would have instrumental 3 value in the absence of intrin-
sic goods. Thus no argument which relies upon the existence of a basic
intrinsic value function can help to establish that instrumental
value necessitates intrinsic goodness, as P5.3 asserts.
This manner of acquiring overall goodness brings us to another
concept of instrumental value:
D5.6 "x has i nstrumental 5 value" means "there is something which
would be overall good if it were to occur and such that its
probability on x is greater than its absolute probabil-
ity." 26
The correspondi ng implication principle is:
P5.6 Necessarily, if something has instrumental value, then some
intrinsically good occurs.
D5.6 does not seem to me to provide us with any familiar notion of
instrumental value. In effect Harman contends that it does:
[W]e must say that S is desirable because of what it is likely to
lead to. S may happen in various ways having different conse-
quences. For example, your giving me ten dollars will have varying
consequences depending on whether you give me the money as a gift,
to hold for purposes of a bet, or to give to someone else. ... S'
s
being desirable because of what it would lead to must be taken as a
special case of S's being desirable because of what it would make
more likely. 2 ?
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These considerations are not convincing. Even if your giving me ten
dollars is very likely to have beneficial consequences, if the unfortu-
nate fact is that it would have only grave results I see no sense in
which it is "desirable" or has "instrumental value," as D5.6 has it. As
I see it, instrumental value turns on only what would happen, not what
i s made 1 i kely.
In any event, we should have no trouble assessing P5.6. If we add
to our most recent example that the patient's joy of recovery would be
overall good, then the admi ni stration of the likely cure has instrumen-
tal 6 value, since it raises the probability of something that would be
overall good. This is so even if the patient fails to recover. No in-
trinsic good has been implied to obtain. So once again the precise con-
cept of instrumental value in question is one concerning which it ought
to be uncontroversial that intrinsic goodness is not implied.
We have seen that when Beardsley, Taylor and Herman criticize
first cause argumentation for the sort of implication that we are consi-
dering they address themselves to notions of instrumental value which
clearly do not require intrinsic goodness. But we have yet to find rea-
son to doubt P5.3 or a genuine problem in the first cause argument for
it that Beardsley formulates.
C. A First Cause Argument Refuted
Can we disprove P5.3 directly? A refutation is at hand, if it is
as easy to become overall good as Hannan's work sugests. For suppose
that a thing can become overall good by just making some would-be
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overall good more probable. Then an event can be conducive to such a
probability-raising overall good-thereby acquiring instrumental
value-while nothing intrinsically good actually occurs. That would do
it. But many will find it doubtful that an event might come to be over-
all good so easily. They will take it as intuitively clear that a thing
must be actually, rather than just probably, beneficial to be actually
good. That is plausible. Other considerations show P5.3 to be false,
however.
P5.3 is about instrumental 3 value. That is gained whenever an
event results in something that has ethical influence which is positive
on balance. So all we need to refute P5.3 is something which counts as
an ethical benefit without introducing any intrinsic good. One way to
be good is to prevent evil. The Dutch boy's act of plugging the dike
was a valuable deed even if no intrinsic good came of it. It was bene-
ficial simply because it kept a catastrophe from coming to pass. An-
other way to be beneficial is to make an improvement. Assuming the pain
of disease to be an intrinsic evil, treatment that causes the pain to
abate is valuable for doing that. There need not be any intrinsic good
added to the situation for the treatment to be overall good. The dimin-
ution or removal of evil suffices. (Perhaps this too is preventing
evil --the evil that would still be there if it were not for the improve-
ment.) Intuitively, the idea is that it is equally creditable to move
the world upward some amount on the overall value scale from what would
have been, whether or not the change introduces something better than
neutral .
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The impact of these observations on P5.3 is clear. Possible si-
tuations exist in which evil is prevented or improvement is made, though
no intrinsic good ever occurs. By being conducive to such prevention or
improvement, events gain instrumental value in the absence of intrin-
sic goods. P5.3 is false.
We ai e now in a position to assess the original argument for P5.3
which was sketched by Beardsley. Recall that the argument moves from
the assumption that instrumental value amounts to "borrowed" value to
the conclusion that it implies some "possessor" of value--some intrinsic
good. It is now plain that this borrowing metaphor is not apt. An
event can have a valuable result, and thereby have instrumental
value, without taking out any "loan" from the intrinsic goodness of an-
other thing. It is enough to keep evil from obtaining or to make things
better. Of course this does not imply that an endless sequence of value
dependents is possible. Rather, it shows that no such series is needed
to have i nstrumental 3 value without intrinsic goodness.
D. A First Cause Argument Upheld
This refutation of P5.3 and the first cause argument for it may
seem unsatisfactory. There remains an intuition that merely removing or
diminishing evil is not good enough to be "truly" instrumental ly good.
What it real ly takes, it might be contended, is contributing something
that is "positively worthwhile." I believe that there is a point to be
made here, but it is not properly construed as a complaint against the
objection to P5.3. Instead we should say that we have another concept
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of goodness which is more stringent than that of being meritorious on
balance-what we have called "overall goodness." Of course one narrower
concept is that of being intrinsically good. That cannot be what we are
looking for. D5.1 gives the most strai ghtforward instrumental connec-
tion to an intrinsic good. And we have seen that it is in a way too
weak and in a way too strong. It is too weak in that contributing to
something merely intrinsically good is insufficient to insure having any
intuitive sort of positive value, and too strong in that it does not
matter for instrumental value whether the contributed good is made so by
intrinsic or instrumental factors. Those reflections lead us to appeal
to overall goodness. Now we are seeking something better. It would be
best if it were a concept which does not manifestly either imply, or
fail to imply, intrinsic goodness. Such a notion of instrumental value
might be at the root of controversy about the implication.
A concept that has the qualities we want can be identified as fol-
lows. First, let us assume for the sake of simplicity that the contin-
gent relation by which an event may acquire instrumental value is causal
contribution, and that cases of improvement that go from bad to less-
than-good can all be counted as cases of prevention. Here is a prelim-
inary (inductive) definition:
D5.7 "q is a causal successor to p" means "either p causally con-
tributes to q or a causal successor p causally contributes to
The causal successors to p, then, are just all the things in all the
causal chains going through p that come after p. Now we identify a
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restricted sort of overall goodness, one where prevention does not
count
:
D5.8 "p is positively worthwhile" means "the overall value of p is
positive even after the prevention-induced value of p and p's
causal successors has been discounted."
The notion is roughly that of being overall good either in virtue of be-
ing intrinsically good or in virtue of causally contributing to overall
goods, where the caused goods themselves are taken to have value in only
those two ways. Now for our final concept of instrumental value:
D5.9 x has i nstrumental g value" means "x causally contributes to
something positively worthwhile."
Here is our final implication principle:
P5.9 Necessarily, if something has i nstrumental g value, then
something intrinsically good occurs.
Loosely speaking, D5.9 identifies the concept of being a means to an im-
provement that goes beyond the neutral point. It seems to conform to
intuitions about instrumental value that might be the basis for a lin-
gering admiration for P5.3. Perhaps, therefore, that is really mis-
placed admiration for P5.9. Yet it is not just obvious that P5.9 is
true. After all, events can be positively worthwhile on purely causal
grounds. Why could not there be an endless sequence of such events,
never tied down to any intrinsic good?
Considerations are available that show P5.9 to be worthy of be-
lief. In outline, the reasoning goes as follows. We consider the total
reservoir of positive value that can be got by causal contribution in
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each possible world. We argue that where the consequent of P5.9 is
false, this repository of value is at best neutral. Thus in no such
world can P5 . 5
' s antecedent be true.
Now for the details. We start by identifying a world's total
stock of positive worth:
The conjunction of valuable effects in w (CVEw") = the con-
junction of every event occurring in w which is positively
worthwhile and to which something causally contributes.
The CVE for a world, w, might be called "the first cause of instrumen-
tal value in w," since each event of i nstrumentalg value in w helps
to cause a conjunct of CVEw. Now we consider an arbitrary world, wl,
where nothing intrinsically good occurs. A thesis:
(T) The i nstrumental g value of every event in wl is no higher
than the positive value of CVEwl.
(T) is entirely credible. As just noted, an event in wl has nowhere to
go for instrumental 9 value but to some conjunct of CVEwl. As a con-
junction, CVEwl summarizes the value of all its conjuncts. So the posi-
tive worth of CVEwl is the highest that can be gained by causal contri-
bution in wl. Thus, to assess P5.5 we should ask: What is the highest
possible value for CVEwl? Well, positive worth is achieved only by in-
trinsic goodness or causal contribution. By hypothesis, there are no
intrinsic goods in wl, and so none conjoined in the CVEwl. If the CVEwl
has any positively worthwhile effects of its own, then by definition
they are among its conjuncts. 28 And in general, the positive value of
a conjunction is determined in part by what its conjuncts help to cause.
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Can CVEwl be better than neutral because of its conjuncts' causal
contributions? No. Any conjunct that causes something positively
worthwhile causes something which is itself a conjunct of CVEwl, by
definition of “CVEw." The vital consequence of this is that any posi-
tive worth that a conjunct has in virtue of what it brings about has its
appropriate influence on the value of CVEwl only if it is not counted in
the cause s contribution to the value of the conjunction CVEwl, but
rather counted as the contribution of the effect alone. To see this
clearly, consider the simple case of the conjunction of an intrinsically
neutral cause with its sole valuable effect. It is plain that the whole
positive value those conjuncts add to that conjunction is the worth con-
tributed by the effect. It would be a mistake also to add the causally
derived value of the cause. But now notice that the same goes for each
conjunct in the CVEwl--its role in determining the positive value of the
CVEwl is properly taken into account only if any worth it gets by being
a cause is ignored, since that worth is fully represented by the contri-
bution its effect makes as a conjunct. Only value as a cause and in-
trinsic value might give positive worth to these effects. Thus just
their intrinsic value is counted toward the positive worth of the CVEwl,
and by the assumption that wl contains no intrinsic good we know that
value to be zero at best.
That exhausts the ways that CVEwl might have come to be positively
worthwhile. All have been seen to fail. (T) enables us to infer from
this that nothing has instrumental value in wl. Since wl is merely
an arbitrarily chosen world in which nothing intrinsically good occurs,
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it follows that i instrumental
g value necessitates intrinsic goodness,
i.e., that P5.9 is true.
We have now examined the full range of prevalent concepts of in-
strumental value. Most of them are readily shown not to imply intrin-
sic goodness, but we have just seen that one concept this question
brings to mind does have that implication. Thus we have the congenial
result that each side in the dispute can be construed to have a founda-
tion in fact. Reflection seems to verify that every consideration for
or against the sort of implication at stake in fact pertains to one or
another of the notions discussed above. If so, and if the above reason
ing has been successful, then the controversy has been resolved.
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4Charles Baylis, "Grading, Values and Choice," Mind 67 (1958),
p. 490.
5 Beardsley, op. cit., p. 4.
8 Ibid.
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p. 5.
^For the sake of uniformity and definiteness we shall assume
here that the bearers of instrumental and intrinsic value are things
that occur--events. (One exception is required to accommodate a cita-
tion. See below, section B, and note 17.) Since the typical instrumen-
tal relation is causation, this is the most natural assumption.
8G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (London: Cambridge University
Press, 1903), p. 21. It should be made clear at this point that our
topic concerns concepts of having instrumental value, not concepts of
being i nstrument al ly good. The distinction is that the former are con-
cepts of being of some good from the instrumental point of view, the
latter are concepts of making instrumental contributions that are on
ance good. Moore is not explicit about which variety he is after
with his account of "good as a means," but brief consideration of it
shows that it is not at all suited to identifying a concept of the lat-
ter sort. D5.1 just looks at one contribution of value, not the on-
balance value of all contributions. (I argue just below that D5.1 does
not even suffice to say what it is to be of some good as a means.)
We will be concerned below with concepts of having some positive
instrumental value of some sort. As in the case of Moore, philosophers
who have done previous work on the topic are best interpreted to be ap-
pealing to those concepts. And more importantly, there is no considera-
tion that distinguishes the plausibility of a some-good-i nstrumental ly
to intrinsic good implication from that of its nearest on-balance-good-
instrumental ly to intrinsic good counterpart. So this difference does
not affect the issue.
^Beardsley, op. cit., p. 5.
l^Bayli s, op. it.
,
p. 490.
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n Beardsley, op. cit., p. 6.
12Baylis, op. cit., pp. 488, 490.
13Beardsley, op. cit., p. 7.
14See section C below.
15Beardsley, op. cit., p. 7.
16 Ibid., p. 8.
.
17MGood he alth" seems to refer to a property, not an event.
D5.4 is intended to express the simplest intuitive instrumental link
between such a property and a goal
.
18Taylor, op. cit., p. 26.
19 Ibid., p. 28.
2G Ibid.
,
p. 32.
21 Ibid
.
,
p. 23.
22Harman, op. cit., p. 800.
23 Ibid., p. 801.
^Harman is interested in an argument for the conclusion that
something is intrinsically good. Since we are concerned with whether
instrumental value of various sorts implies intrinsic goodness, Harman's
arugment has been adjusted to conclude with P5.4—the conditional that
comes closest to what we seek.
25Hanrian, op. cit., pp. 800-804.
28 Ibid., pp. 796-798. Harman does not formulate D5.6, but some
such concept is clearly suggested ther.
27 ibid.
,
p. 797.
28jhe principle that nothing can cause one of its own conjuncts
is intuitively attractive. If it is true, then CVEwl can have no posi-
tively worthwhile effects. The important thing here is that whether
this principle is true or not, only the CVEwl's conjuncts might give it
causally derived worth.
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